SIGMUND FREUD was born in the small town of Freiberg, Austria, now the Czech Republic. In this Special Edition of The American Psychoanalyst, we celebrate that day, 150 years ago, with 11 articles from distinguished members of the American Psychoanalytic Association and invited guests. This issue seeks to set off a few depth charges to sound the water’s depth and, as though with sonar, to map the contours of the intellectual seabed.

Peter Loewenberg, in his article on "Freud as a Cultural Historian," quotes W.H. Auden describing Freud as "a whole climate of opinion." Writing an overview, "Predicting the Future of Psychoanalysis," Sander Abend notes that the high point of psychoanalytic treatment may be past, but Freud’s increasing importance in countries of the Middle East and Asia suggests a challenge to arguments that he is solely a product of fin-de-siècle Vienna. Yet Elizabeth Ann Danto, in her article, "At What Cost? Perspectives from the History of the Free Psychoanalytic Clinics," points out the powerful impact on Freud of turn-of-the-century social democracy.

We have attempted to stand in the historical moment and raise necessary questions about the future. So Robert Michels questions whether the goal of psychoanalytic education is to train effective practitioners in the community or advance the growth of psychoanalytic theory. And Robert Paul finds that contemporary anthropologists, split between evolutionary and biological thinkers and cultural thinkers, must be challenged by Freud’s ease in moving between the two realms. Mark Smaller, in an interview, engages Mark Solms in a discussion about his involvement with neuro-psychoanalysis, the physiological correlates of psychic functions that Freud hoped would be established. And Henry Smith, looking at technique, considers the ubiquity of necessary enactments in the world of transference.

We have been pleased so many noted authors have agreed to participate in our forum. The humanities, as seen above and below, have provided fertile fields for psychoanalytic thinking. Naomi Janowitz traces a number of contemporary responses to Freud’s contributions to religious studies. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl discusses the impact of a concept from

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Introduction

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outside psychoanalysis, “gender,” on psychoanalytic thinking. Eschewing the traditional psychoanalytic approach to aesthetics paralleling the interpretation of dreams, Gilbert Rose investigates the importance of form in nonverbal art. In his two-pronged essay, Peter Loewenberg reveals the importance of empathy and imagination in historical research and understanding and, in counterpoint to Danto, points to Freud’s pessimism.

How we read Freud is still an art of controversy. New translations of Freud are appearing in English and in French in this, the 21st century. Emmett Wilson discusses the English and German standard editions in this new, and invigorating, context.

All in all, on publication of our forum, which could easily have been enhanced by many times over the number of contributions, we are convinced that psychoanalysis is thriving in this, the year of Freud’s sesquicentennial.

—Michael Slevin     Editor, TAP
A House Divided

The theory, practice, and institutions of psychoanalysis began with Sigmund Freud. This issue is a beautiful marker of his effort—of where he began, the impact he made, and some of the challenges facing psychoanalysis in the year 2006. A serious challenge and threat face our Association, as we work to reorganize. That work is critical; and I must turn our attention to it on this, the 150th anniversary of Freud’s birth.

No one could have witnessed the rancorous proceedings in Council or paid even the slightest attention to the listservs without realizing that our governance is in crisis. As the E-news bulletins show, the Association is doing well yet governance has been unable to put a framework around our most contentious issues. In the absence of that framework, the voices of division have become more strident and self-congratulatory and statesmanship has been all but silenced. The report of the Task Force on Reorganization (TFoR) promised to provide a framework for change, but, as almost everyone knows, the reorganization process was derailed in Council and the task force was left wrecked and demoralized. Instead of a deliberative process, we have threats of externalization, splitting, and lawsuits. Anyone who loves this organization cannot help but be dismayed.

As in the American Civil War, there is more history behind our problems than is easily summarized. In brief, we were once a federation of local programs and that mentality persists in some quarters. Furthermore, there can be tension between societies and institutes locally and, regardless of some of the progress of our component societies and institutes toward resolving that issue, the tension is memorialized in our Association’s governance. In that governance, beyond standing as a monument to our federation period and ancient tensions, it is as

Jon Meyer, M.D., is president of the American Psychoanalytic Association.

though we never became a membership organization and as though no one ever questioned why there should be any substitute for the direct vote of members in electing their representatives. Nothing is more democratic than the vote.

Our members invest in the Association through many wellsprings of affiliation: interests in clinical work, activism, friendships, continuing education, science, psychoanalytic and psychotherapy education, and standards. Most members are not ideologues, could not care less about slogans, and do not employ one-issue litmus tests. Unfortunately, in politics we have slogans (democracy, standards), enemies (“BOPStists,” training analysts, the “Wednesday Group”), litmus tests (firewalls, New York law), threats of legal schism (compliance, externalization), and, ultimately, a shortage of statesmanship.

There have been efforts before to deal with these chronic tensions through reorganization. The last one, about 10 years ago, crashed and burned in the Council for two reasons: It was a flawed plan and many councilors voted their self-interest. I know because I was one who led the charge against what I viewed as a cumbersome plan and, besides, I was not going to let anyone take away my newly acquired Council seat. What we got as a result was another decade of increasing rancor.

Now at the end of that decade, we need reorganization more than ever and the legal reasons are the least of it. The real reason, as Niko Canner astutely observed, is a severely contracting market—not only for our practice but also for our ideas and values. We must become more effective. To do so, we must resolve these age-old tensions and allow ourselves to think more creatively. Impaneling the TFoR was an attempt to do that, with the way for it carefully prepared through a series of communications from Newell Fischer and me, a presentation by Victoria Bjorklund, a mandate from the Council to start the process, and membership ratification of the TFoR. Following on that painstaking effort at communication and structure, the task force labored for a year and a half.

Given the care and the hard work, why is it that the process lies in shambles and the politics of polarization are in full sway? The reasons are similar to those 10 years ago: This plan was innovative and complex, requiring thought, and self-interest held sway. To simplify the objectives behind the reorganization effort, there were only two major goals. The first was to invest members with directly elected representation on the board of directors; to streamline the board of directors to a functional size, and to make provision for needed extra-analytic talents in fundraising, public relations, law, finance, governmental relations, and corporate relations. A modern board has to raise money; not just oversee its expenditure, and it has to provide needed expertise and access to accomplish the Association’s missions of protecting psychoanalysis and seeing it thrive. The second task was to secure and stabilize the major asset of our educational programs in a time of transition. Education is our number one priority, but if our fiduciaries choose to overlook that, then there should at least be concern about those functions as our major source of new members, now and for the future. One way to stabilize that asset was through the mechanism of a subsidiary corporation—one of the three possibilities outlined by Bjorklund—which would keep BOPS within the Association yet allow some insulation for the accreditation and certifying functions. There was not

“[A house divided against itself cannot stand].”
—Abraham Lincoln

REORGANIZATION CRUCIAL

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Given the care and the hard work, why is it that the process lies in shambles and the politics of even a serious discussion of these major goals and those options.

Building up to the American Civil War, there was a great divide in values. That divide was not addressed through statesmanship but rather through secession and conflict. In our organization, there is serious talk of externalizing accreditation and certification and of institutes going their own way. The problem with those approaches—as appealing as they may be to some on the right and the left—is the likelihood that moving institutes and functions outside the Association will take members with them and we will split.

I want to do all I can to get the reorganization process—and I emphasize process—back on track. Discussions are going on with leaders of Council and BOPS to find a way to get representatives of the two bodies together, meeting and talking. While for all of

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Where Do We Go from Here?  
Eric J. Nuetzel

We are a deeply divided organization. Although we are past the vote on the “local option” bylaw amendment and have learned the recommendations of the Task Force on Reorganization (TFoR), we remain unsettled. The proposed bylaw allowing institutes the option of opting out of the certification requirement for training and/or supervising analyst (T/SA) appointments and preventing the Board on Professional Standards (BOPS) from using certification as a requirement for T/SA appointments was not adopted. Yet a significant majority of our members supported the change. The divisions in our organization remain and will not go away easily. So, where do we go from here? Where can we go from here?

The efforts by the Certification Research and Development Advisory Committee (CARD) to assess and improve our certification procedure are known widely and are well underway. Still, the efforts of BOPS in this regard are unlikely to satisfy critics of certification. The affect associated with the criticism goes beyond arguments about reliability and validity. The fact is that many have felt injured by our certification procedure, by other decisions of BOPS, and/or by decisions within an institute regulated by BOPS. Such injuries can lead to the conviction that our educational system is deeply flawed. Regardless, BOPS, as obligated by our bylaws, does its best to do a creditable job with its public interest tasks (standard setting, accreditation, and certification) in a difficult political environment. We can and should do better. We can start by asking, is our system fundamentally flawed? What would be best for our Association and, more importantly, for the public and for our profession? Should all educational public interest regulation procedures of our component institutes and graduate members take place within our Association? Many on all sides of our Association’s political spectrum believe they should be conducted by a body or bodies external to our organization.

The tradition of the Association has been to delegate educational public interest regulatory functions to BOPS. The resentment of the authority granted to BOPS through our bylaws has contributed to the chasms in our Association. Unfortunately, injustices have occurred in our Association at least in part due to decisions of BOPS. No one likes injustice and those performing regulatory tasks in the public’s good are obligated to try to prevent injustice of any kind. Although BOPS has continually tried to meet its obligations in a thoughtful, deliberative, and scientifically sound and fair way, it has become a political target. Things are unlikely to improve for the Association, BOPS, and the public interest functions unless significant changes are made.

The psychoanalytic world is larger than our Association, and our Association is larger than those who identify with our institutes. Tensions inevitably arise. Standard setting, accrediting, and certifying bodies require functional independence to work effectively in the public’s interest. This is what our current bylaws intended to accomplish. Although our current bylaws have checks and balances and a separation of powers to manage inevitable organizational tension, reorganization is necessary because our bylaws are out of compliance with New York State law. Change is also necessary because our members want it. If the public interest functions of BOPS are to continue, we need to ask whether the public and the profession are best served by having these functions within our organization.

BOPS SUCCESSOR

For our Association, this is a basic issue. We need to give serious thought to our structure, mission, and the proper place for the public interest functions. The Task Force on Reorganization has recommended that we form a successor to BOPS, a Council of Institutes that would be structured as a subsidiary corporation. The subsidiary corporation for education will only be feasible if the membership supports its formation. Many on the TFoR, in the membership, and on the Executive Council do not. The idea of a subsidiary corporation is anathema to many for a variety of reasons. In 2003, the Ad Hoc Committee to Study Certification recommended, among other things, the complete externalization of certification. The TFoR’s recommendation for a subsidiary corporation is a compromise that would keep these functions within the organization while also preserving some autonomy in the setting of educational standards, for the accreditation of institutes, and for the certification of graduates.

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In the Fall/Winter 2004 issue of TAP, I urged the membership to accept a subsidiary corporation for the educational regulatory functions of BOPS as an evolutionary step (TAP Vol. 38, No.4, p. 5). As events have unfolded I have developed concerns that the subsidiary model may be flawed for two reasons: It may institutionalize one of the many splits in our Association, membership functions versus educational functions, and it does not accomplish what is needed—real independence for the public interest functions.

The time for change has arrived; we cannot have it both ways.

Standard setting, accrediting, and certifying bodies must be autonomous to have integrity.

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Gourguechon Chosen President-Elect; “Local Option” Bylaw Falls Short at 56.9 Percent

With 41 percent of APsaA members voting, current APsaA Secretary Prudence L. Gourguechon defeated APsaA Treasurer Warren R. Procci in the race for president-elect. Gourguechon won 689 votes to Procci’s 633.

Gourguechon’s election left one year of her term as secretary unfilled. According to APsaA bylaws, the Council votes to fill the term in such circumstances. Jonathan House was elected at the January Council meeting to complete Gourguechon’s term. Opposing House in the Council election were Lee Ascherman, Christine Hradesky, Richard Lightbody, Mary Scharold, Sherwood Waldron, and Sandra Walker.

In the fall election for councilor-at-large, the members elected Elise W. Snyder and Robert Tyson. Ralph Fishkin and Sandra Walker also ran for these offices.

Two bylaw amendments appeared on the fall ballots. The “local option” amendment, which would have removed (and prohibited the BOPS from re-imposing) the certification requirement not only for TA/SA appointments, but also for service as officers and fellows of BOPS committees, received 56.9 percent of the vote. Institutes would also have had the option of continuing to require certification for TA/SA appointment. The other amendment, to accept International Psychoanalytical Association graduates as APsaA members without further vetting, received 91 percent of the votes. As bylaw amendments require a two-thirds vote for passage, only the bylaw governing IPA graduates was passed.

Where Do We Go from Here?

As I think we all know, their decisions may not be popular. As attached as many of our members are to the public interest functions of BOPS, these functions should be outside the Association. Whether and how this can be accomplished is another matter. What is clear is that we cannot continue with a system designed over 50 years ago for a vastly different psychoanalytic landscape. Clearly, the psychoanalytic world is changing, and the Association needs to change with it. Institute representation and supportive educational functions of BOPS should continue to reside within the Association in some way, shape, or form. Education is our membership’s number one priority. The public interest functions of educational standard setting, institute accreditation, and graduate certification need to reside elsewhere, outside of the Association. It is time to recognize that the public interest and the good of the profession demand change. So does the educational atmosphere within our own institutes. BOPS will safeguard its public interest functions as we work out a way to assure their survival in an external form. Meanwhile, BOPS cannot remain static.

One of the most unfortunate aspects of the conflicts and tensions within our Association is the polarization and resultant rigidity on all sides. This creates an environment in which creative thinking about improving education, including the public interest functions of BOPS, is in short supply. The atmosphere in our Association is not helping us improve the education of our candidates. As we move through this transition, I urge us to remember that safeguarding and improving candidate education is the fundamental concern of BOPS.

A House Divided

us I hoped for a positive response, my efforts were rejected the first time I tried. It is so important that I will try again. Refusal to talk with others who disagree may be politics as usual but is neither responsible nor statesmanlike.

Springfield, Illinois, was Abraham Lincoln’s home for most of his adult life before he became president. As a kid growing up in Springfield, I was steeped in Lincoln’s life and his quotes. On June 16, 1858, in Springfield, Lincoln delivered a speech attempting to address the growing divide in our country. In its most memorable line, he said, “A house divided against itself cannot stand.” Unfortunately, that forethought has never seemed more to the point and the warning has never seemed more urgent. Lincoln’s concern rings as true now as it did then and, if we have trouble listening to each other, we should at least listen to the lessons of history.

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International News
Montreal Psychoanalytic Consultation Center

The Montreal Psychoanalytic Society (Société Psychanalytique de Montréal—SPM), the French branch of the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society, has created a psychoanalytic clinic, the primary aim of which is to make psychoanalytic services accessible to a particular patient group. The committee working on the consultation center was mandated 10 years ago by the SPM to propose a model with the social objective of addressing the mental health needs of those who have limited financial means—young adults, precarious employed workers, recent immigrants, single parents, or people living on unemployment or welfare—and who suffer from severe depression, borderline or narcissistic pathology, and certain types of psychoses.

To meet its objective, the Montreal clinic has looked to existing models such as the London Psychoanalytical Clinic and the Tavistock Clinic in England, and the Centre de Consultation Jean Favreau and the Centre Jean et Evelyne Kestenberg in France. Isabelle Lasvergnas, an analyst and sociology professor who chairs the committee of the Montreal clinic, has studied these four clinics and describes them as having the same social preoccupation, namely to treat individuals with severe pathology who have poor financial resources. The Montreal clinic will continue to have close contact with the French and British clinics and draw on their experience in modifying the classical psychoanalytic frame. Along with a one-on-one therapy or analysis, the British model emphasizes a psychoanalytically-oriented group approach; and the French clinics have evolved an analytic type of drama therapy based on free association rather than role play.

Because of decreasing financial support for mental health and long term dynamic treatments from the Quebec government, the Montreal center is following the example of the British clinics, which are privately funded by donations (in France the clinics are completely supported by the government). In Montreal, however, patients will be asked to pay a minimal fee, even if it involves only a token, to be sure that they will be implicated in their own treatment.

The Montreal center has received an IPA Developing Psychoanalytic Practice and Training (DPPT) grant to begin its fundraising campaign to publicize the benefits of the psychoanalytical approach.

Mental Health University Created By Psychoanalytic Association in Argentina

The University Institute of Mental Health (IUSAM) of the Buenos Aires Psychoanalytic Association (APdeBA) celebrated its official recognition as a fully accredited university in November 2005. According to Sara Zac de Filc, ex-president of APdeBA, the creation of IUSAM has been the result of a nine-year struggle with the Ministries of Education and Health to gain acceptance of the degree of psychoanalysis given by APdeBA. In Argentina, local universities can give graduate degrees in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis (not following IPA’s standards), thereby giving their graduates a position of advantage as compared to graduates of APdeBA who receive a much more comprehensive training.

IUSAM-APdeBA will provide university education in three areas: 1) exclusive training in psychoanalysis according to IPA standards (training analysis, supervisions and seminars); 2) a psychoanalytic understanding of mental health through the lens of culture and the community, e.g., violence, alienation, migration, social trauma, inequality, etc.; and 3) a psychoanalytic and interdisciplinary training in the mental health and psychopathology of individuals, family, and group structures. Child and adolescent psychoanalysis according to IPA standards will also be a requirement.

The University Institute will also increase the services offered to the community by APdeBA, such as low-cost therapeutic assistance or analytically-based psychotherapies, cultural activities, training, and advice to state and local governments; and providing educational opportunities to professionals from other disciplines.

It is hoped that the official recognition of a university status for psychoanalytical training and education, and the integration of psychoanalysis with other academic fields, such as psychology, medicine, public health, social science, linguistics, law, and education, will provide a stronger and better presence of psychoanalysis in the community.

APsaA News
Electronic Medical Records

The health care system in the United States, once among the finest in the world, has been steadily deteriorating for the last 14 years.

The reason can be summed up in two words: “managed care,” a system in which economic control over the delivery of health care is turned over to private, for-profit companies. This system is now infiltrating other countries.

In 1993, faced with the threat of the Clinton health plan, which would have made managed care the national standard and private practice illegal, the American Psychoanalytic Association joined a vigorous and ultimately successful campaign to protect private practice. From that beginning, APsaA has become a highly visible and effective force in Congress for the protection of the rights of our patients, particularly the privacy of mental health records.

The current legislative threat is electronic medical records (EMRs).

The EMR legislation as introduced into Congress removes all control over health care information from every citizen. Current federal EMR legislation overrides state privacy laws and makes no provision for patient consent prior to the routine release of personal health information.

This legislation directly threatens all psychoanalytic and psychodynamic therapies, including private practice. If psychotherapy records are no longer private, patients will be reluctant to participate in treatment and confide in their therapists. APsaA is taking the lead in Congress to modify these bills. For instance, APsaA recruited 30 mental health organizations to send a letter to every member of Congress calling for the inclusion of patient consent in any EMR system.

Christine Ury, D.Ps., is associate editor and international editor of TAP. She is a faculty member at the Canadian Institute of Psychoanalysis and has a private practice in Montreal.
Predicting the Future of Psychoanalysis
Sander M. Abend

It is no secret that psychoanalysts today harbor considerable malaise about the future of our profession. Predicting its future invites speculation that is divided between optimism, perhaps influenced to some degree by wishful thinking, and pessimism, consequent to certain economic, demographic, and cultural trends that contribute to our current concern. In trying to divine what lies in store for us, it will be advantageous to consider the legacy of Freud's revolutionary thinking separately from the subject of the continuing evolution of psychoanalytic theory, as well as from the prospects of psychoanalysis as a therapy, although these three topics are obviously interconnected.

It is perhaps an article of faith from one whose intellectual development and professional life have, in large measure, been determined by the compelling power of Freud's great discoveries, but it is extremely hard for me to imagine that the insights into childhood psychological development and the understanding of adult mental life, especially its motivations and mechanisms, that he presented to the world will ever fade into obscurity. Indeed, any student of history, mythology, literature, or anthropology cannot fail to be impressed by the explanatory value of his fundamental contributions to our knowledge of human psychology and behavior; that is, unless he or she has personal reasons to deny their importance. In fact, one of Freud's most significant contributions was his appreciation of the source and nature of the rejection of his findings by many of his contemporaries, and that is still evident today, both inside and outside our profession. This resistance, as he would have called it, takes the form of either outright rejection of its precepts, or, more subtly, as a partial acceptance qualified by emendations, omissions, or additions that distort or obscure its essential core.

This is not to suggest that Freud had the last word to say about everything psychoanalytic. To be sure, he was sometimes incorrect or incomplete, and many of his successors worked hard to refine his contributions, just as others offered alterations of a more profound nature. Nevertheless, the essence of Freud's grasp of human psychology has been absorbed into our intellectual life and culture, not to mention our understanding of development and psychopathology, even in the face of the strong appeal engendered by resistance. It is also noteworthy that the interest in Freud's ideas in countries in Asia and the Middle East, where psychoanalysis is growing in popularity, strongly suggests that his crucial discoveries are not so constrained by fin-de-siècle European cultural norms as has been maintained by some critics of Freudian psychoanalysis.

EXPLORATION AND ELABORATION

This leads me to a consideration of the second topic, the ongoing exploration and elaboration of psychoanalytic theory, or theories. Every psychoanalyst and student of psychoanalysis is aware that our profession's theoretical edifice has evolved in an atmosphere of controversy, sometimes civilized, often competitive to the point of outright hostility. Personal rivalries, passionate loyalties, and near-religious fervor have engendered splits, and given birth to entire schools of thought and practice, all claiming a place under the mantle of psychoanalysis. I believe that in our present state of knowledge it is not possible for us to arrive at an objective, much less definitive, comparative evaluation of the differences in approach, emphasis, and belief that characterize the various psychoanalytic theories that confront us today. Other analysts express their preferences on the basis of their own education, convictions, and clinical experience, just as I do. As I have suggested, even modifications to the historical core of Freud's work can be seen either as useful refinements and necessary development of Freudian psychoanalytic theory, or as subtle or frank challenges to fundamental ideas and opinions which other analysts still believe to be correct, or even crucial to the psychoanalytic enterprise. Still other alternative psychoanalytic thinkers take much more profound exception to the Freudian corpus and set forth substantially different approaches to the understanding of development, psychopathology, and normal behavior; and to the practice of psychoanalytic therapy itself. Sotto voce dismissals of opposing theories and theorists as misguided, or as inspired by resistance, or on the other hand as hopelessly and blindly outmoded, are as familiar in our profession's history as is our record of clamorous debate. Some schisms, such as the celebrated struggle between the followers of Melanie Klein and those of the Freuds, have progressed from contentious rivalry to tolerant co-existence within the house of international psychoanalysis. Other differences have been less compatible and more bitterly divisive, as is well known.

Sander M. Abend, M.D., is training and supervising analyst at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, past editor-in-chief of the Psychoanalytic Quarterly, past chair of AFSAA’s Committee on Psychoanalytic Education, and a member of the Board of Representatives and Education Committee of the International Psychoanalytic Association.

Photo: Freud Museum, London

1866 Sigmund with his father Jacob Freud

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Future of Psychoanalysis
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The past two decades or so have been marked by a dramatic shift in the atmosphere of psychoanalytic debate. Interchanges between proponents of differing views, theories, and technical precepts have become much more frequent and better publicized. Competition remains, to be sure, but genuine efforts to clarify and demonstrate these differences, and to expound the assumptions and observations on which they are based, are everywhere evident in our conferences and our professional literature. Some analysts in all camps remain unmoved and unchanged in their views by these interactive efforts, while others may seek at least a partial inclusion of other approaches and ideas into their own intellectual and technical arsenals.

It is difficult to assess the impact of this changing climate on present day students of psychoanalysis. Some must be stimulated, others confused, and most, if not all, primarily influenced by the attitudes and atmospheres of their own institutes and teachers. Passion and misunderstandings surely persist, and are likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

All the same, it is impossible to overlook the intellectual ferment of our times, and I believe it is fair to think of this change as a normal and healthy developmental step in our field. At least in some quarters, psychoanalytic education is far less parochial than was true in the past.

NEW IDEAS

Other recent trends also deserve notice. New ideas about early childhood development have entered our discussions of theory and practice, and this emerging modification of traditional thinking promises to expand the intellectual controversy we are experiencing. It is too early to say whether radically different views of development, pathology, and treatment will become schismatic influences or will be absorbed into the fabric of our professional culture. Certainly, there are a number of figures among our important thinkers and teachers who seem to be devoted to grappling and embracing even quite diverse ideas about psychoanalytic theory and practice.

Others are more concerned with promoting adherence to and refinement of the point of view they deem to be most correct and useful. The safest prediction would appear to be that divisions and controversies will be with us going forward, despite the efforts toward understanding and assimilating provocative new ideas that we see all around us today.

One rapidly accelerating field of research which is certain to provide data that pose many interesting challenges for our theories, and which will present us with new knowledge that inevitably will require integration into our psychoanalytic point of view, is that of neuroscience. Despite the preference of those who would see psychoanalysis as strictly a social science, informed by a philosophical, linguistic, or literary tradition, my own background in medicine leads me to assert with conviction that the psychological realm is an expression of brain function, and that brain function in turn is unavoidably affected by psychological factors and forces.

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This competitive environment has become even more problematic for psychoanalysis as a result of the introduction of effective psychopharmacological agents, and, later, of behavioral therapies focused on rapid symptom relief without requiring people to come to grips with the disturbing content of their unconscious minds. Adding to the problem was the...
In 1918, psychoanalysis found itself in crisis. "Therapeutic activities are not far-reaching," Freud lamented, and "even by working very hard," the analysts' results "are almost negligible [given] the vast amount of neurotic misery…. At present we do nothing for the wider social strata." Freud's solution to this impasse was to create "institutions or outpatient clinics…[where] treatment will be free." And in the next decade, in Vienna, Berlin, Budapest, and London, some of the movement's most interesting thinkers, like Sandor Ferenczi, Ernst Simmel, Edith Jacobson, Otto Fenichel, and Wilhelm Reich, followed Freud and indeed made psychoanalysis accessible to students, artists, craftsmen, laborers, factory workers, office clerks, unemployed people, farmers, domestic servants, and public school teachers.

By 1924, public interest in psychoanalysis "actually moved faster than…the medical profession," Paul Federn wrote, and the Viennese demanded psychoanalytic information, referrals, and advice from their doctors in virtually all areas of specialization. Psychoanalysis even found its way into the tabloids of the day. "Lonesome: You are 29-years-old, intelligent, educated, with a good job and you long for a companion who would share with you sorrow and joy…. This is no doubt a case which necessitates psychoanalytic treatment. Consult with the Psychoanalytic Ambulatorium, Vienna, Ninth District, 18 Pelikangasse, Office hours from 6 to 7 p.m.,” answered the magazine columnist from Bettauere's Wochenschrift.

Nearly a century later, "neurotic misery" remains widespread, clinicians and consumers are peeved, and at one time or another, the professional journals speak to the decline in psychoanalytic practice or issue a postmortem for the profession. The number of free-standing outpatient mental health clinics decreased dramatically in the last decades of the 20th century, from 51.4 percent of all outpatient services in 1970 to 25.3 percent in 1988. Moreover, the press for affordability has become an increasingly dominant controversy within the clinics, institutes, and other organized providers of mental health services today. In other words, the moment bodes well for psychoanalysis to re-examine how the profession re-invented itself 90 years ago.

This re-invention may already be underway. Since 1998, the Association has encouraged the efforts of community-based programs around the country, and most institutes (as well as private practitioners) maintain a range of low-cost services. To support these endeavors, however, analysts must grapple with the issue posed in 1925 by the German psychoanalyst Max Eitingon: For a clinic to be successful, as Eitingon explained in his annual report on the Berlin Poliklinik (the Berlin Society’s free clinic), the analysts should agree that “the factor of the patients paying or not paying has no influence on the course of the analysis.” Eitingon’s line of reasoning followed Freud’s own social democratic idea, ‘that the poorest man should have just as much right to assistance for his mind as he now has to lifesaving help offered by surgery,’ and that the fee—or lack thereof—was as much the clinician’s issue as the patient’s.

Unlike today’s low-cost clinics, the Poliklinik and the Vienna Ambulatorium (the cooperative clinic associated with the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society), were free clinics literally and metaphorically: They freed people of their neuroses and, like the municipal schools and universities of Europe, they were free of charge. In the heady climate of progressivism and social movement between the two world wars, psychoanalysis was believed to share in the transformation of civil society and the new outpatient treatment centers were to help restore people to their inherently self-regulating and productive selves. Continued on page 10

**At What Cost?**

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Like all free clinics historically, these had the role of providing mental health care to poor people, the socially disenfranchised, and those who sought help through untraditional channels. Of course, as Anna Freud said in 1968, the psychoanalysts too were viewed as untraditional, as “pioneers, not only because they broke new ground, but also in the sense that their endeavors ran counter to and ignored the conventional restrictions of their time.”16 Most of the analysts never even considered weighing the effectiveness of treatment against the financial burden imposed on the patient. What’s more, they assumed a specific obligation to donate a portion of their time to people who could not otherwise afford treatment.

**FUNDING STRATEGIES**

The free clinics changed the way analysts reached all social classes without changing the therapeutic process. Their funding strategies were interesting. For one, the systematic distribution of Erlagscheine, or vouchers, to current or prospective patients (who would later use the voucher as a form of currency to pay another doctor) made for an especially versatile type of personal check. Within a medical community like a hospital, an authorized signer could use the voucher to personally reimburse a colleague who had donated time to treat a patient. In private practice, a physician could endorse an Erlagschein to a clinic like the Ambulatorium, as a monthly financial contribution, substituting the donation for treatment hours they would ordinarily provide in person. Freud, arguably the original private practitioner of psychoanalysis, regularly wrote out monthly Erlagscheine of 200 to 400 shillings (roughly $50 to $100) for the clinic. Of course, some patients did pay according to a sliding scale of fees. But relying on patient fees was both risky and ideologically counterproductive, and it made little sense in a post-war economy of high unemployment and inflation.

The governing Social Democrats kept wages deliberately low, and instead used local taxes to build up a large scale public health, welfare, sanitation, and housing infrastructure. Unlike individual wages, these centrally planned projects effectively redistributed taxes toward those most in need. Along the same lines, the psychoanalysts (at least two of whom, Josef Freud- jung and Paul Federn, were City Council members) formulated the “one-fifth” formula whereby, of every five patients, one would be treated gratis. Psychoanalytic society members who decided not to treat patients free of charge according to the “one-fifth” rule, contributed instead to the salaries of a growing number of paid assistants and interns at the clinics: In 1924, all Society members in Berlin and Vienna allocated an additional 4 percent of their membership fees to support the clinics.7

This revenue, along with occasional cash infusions from Max Eitingon in Berlin, and later Pyns Hopkins in London and Marie Bonaparte in Paris (in addition to some Americans) pretty much sustained the clinics.

The rise of free clinics, then, allowed psychoanalysts to be consistent with the prevailing Social Democratic model and, at the same time, to increase the visibility of their new profession in almost all major cities in Europe. “In the long run the success of a clinic would mean a general encouragement of psychoanalysis,” Freud’s translator and friend, James Strachey, wrote from London to his wife Alix, then living in Berlin, “and would eventually benefit us personally.”8 The Vienna Ambulatorium provided a perfect case in point. The free clinic did not seek out a mainstream patient base and was sustained relatively cheaply. Inside the cramped medical offices that the Ambulatorium shared with a hospital’s cardiology unit, the analytic couch was a metal examination table with a thin springless mattress.

Dozens of people a day streamed through the doors at 18 Pelikangasse without distinction of illness or social class, heart patients in the morning mingling with analytic patients in the afternoon and evening. The clinic did so well that Eduard Hirschmann, the director, complained in 1932 of its overuse by schools and clubs, teachers, school doctors, and personal pediatricians who referred children “from all strata of the necessitous classes.”9 It did even better with adult men who outnumbered female patients in most years by at least 50 percent; to go by Hirschmann’s data, “impotence” ranked as the clinic’s most frequently recorded diagnosis, reiterating how psychoanalysis would give men—who already had more social freedom than women—license to address sexual dysfunction and, coincidentally, produce families and rebuild a vigorous state.

Not that women were ignored. It was one of the accomplishments of psychoanalysis to assert that women did have sexuality, but saying that women of the “lower” classes had sexual autonomy was even more daring.

In Berlin, itself a great center of urban daring in the 1920s, Max Eitingon ran the Poliklinik with clinical judgments that could seem idiosyncratic today, and he tended to challenge the analysts on their views of treatment and social class. Psychoanalysts like Otto Fenichel and Ernst Simmel, who were gratified by his wholesale trust in patients’ honesty (that they “pay as much or as little as they can or think they can”),10 also applauded his fondness for collecting data (“statistics…[are] the test of our courage”). They liked to try out his variations on treatment (“to systematically and in every case reduce the length of the analytic sitting from one hour to half-an-hour,” for example) and experimented with time limits, crisis intervention, “fractionary” or “interrupted” schedules, and active therapies presumably influenced by Ferenczi. Eitingon seized on and supported Freud’s call for free clinics early, precisely because he found that, “in private practice [these experiments] could never be undertaken.” Freud’s own promotion of Eitingon and the Poliklinik’s mission was only the beginning and he worried that the analysts’ enthusiasm might diminish. In a 1935 epilogue to his brief bittersweet autobiography, Freud added, “Out of their own funds, local societies support…outpatient clinics in which experienced analysts as well as students give free treatment to patients of limited means.”11

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Freud on Religion: Looking Back At the Future of an Illusion

Naomi Janowitz

Freud’s ideas about sexuality were disturbing in his day, but are well-worn and familiar today. His ideas about religion experienced the reverse fate. Widely accepted by his early followers, they now seem inadequate, and, for those analysts who embrace religion or spirituality, they remain disturbing.

For Freud, religion arose in the first place to defend against childhood experiences of helplessness. All religions are “mass delusions” (SE 21:18), based on wishful thinking. Religious beliefs are always expressions of the infantile in mental life. Freud most famously compared religious ritual with obsessive neurotic behavior. After discussing Moses and Monotheism, I will review some of the recent attempts to rethink these concepts, pointing to what I think remains valuable. While, for example, his analysis of ritual was much too narrow, many of his basic insights remain compelling.

It is easy to dismiss Freud on religion because his writings on this topic are quite puzzling, especially the “historical novel,” Moses and Monotheism. Freud posited, even insisted on, the historical accuracy of his reconstruction of ancient history long after he had abandoned, for example, the idea that reports of childhood seduction were accurate. The killing of the primal father by the horde had actually taken place, and was then subsequently reenacted in the killing of Moses, an Egyptian bureaucrat who introduced Jews to the failed monotheistic ideas of Pharaoh Akhenaton in an attempt to preserve that legacy. This is surely the weakest of Freud’s writings since the narrative it recounts is not true. Yet, Robert Paul masterfully cuts through this knot, solving the dilemma by pointing to the Torah story (1996). Alfred Kroeber reviewed Moses and Monotheism as, to use Freud’s term, a Just So story (1952:306). Paul replies: Yes, it is a myth and we can tell you exactly where it comes from.

That is, the mythic story Freud describes comes from the Torah story itself, which influenced Freud in ways he did not appear to be fully conscious of. Thus Paul saves Freud from himself, placing the story of Moses and the horde in the category of myth, where it belongs. We are free then to analyze the unconscious power that myth has in shaping society, including the persuasive example of the unconscious power of myth even on Freud himself.

This unraveling of the relationship between Freud’s life story as a Jew and his theories is much more convincing than numerous other attempts to explain his stance on religion based on, for example, a problematic relationship with his mother or some other specific aspect of his early childhood experiences (Zilboorg 1958).

Once the historical claims have been re-thought, much work remains. Many early analytic studies of Freud followed in his mythic search for the origins of religion so are of only historical interest to us now. On top of this, as Jonathan Lear has forcefully argued in his recent introduction to Freud, Freud’s position on religion is lacking a firm philosophical grounding (2005). This problem is not unique to Freud’s work on religion, since, as Lear himself notes, central philosophical questions such as whether the unconscious has propositional philosophical content are actively being debated. But it is another sign of the inadequacy of Freud’s schema.

Some early followers of Freud rejected his critical attitude towards religion but it is primarily in the past few decades that major revisions have gained currency. Many analysts have been drawn to Winnicott’s notion of a transitional object to “undercut Freud’s rigid dualism between the objective and subjective” (Jones 1991:38). God or, some type of spirituality, functions as a transitional object. This object fuses illusion and reality, to some extent bracketing questions about a god/spirit’s existence. The attractiveness of this position depends on an analyst’s willingness to equate a god/spirit with other more concrete transitional objects. So, too, object relations theory is used to posit a god/spirit as a necessary object, without which a person would have no integrated self or morals.

Both of these approaches depend on an outdated notion of “homo religiosus,” the necessarily religious person. The picture of religion presupposed is a very domesticated version, created primarily by the individual him/herself and devoid of connection to major religious institutions and structures (Blass 2004).

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Naomi Janowitz, Ph.D., is a professor and director of religious studies at the University of California-Davis and an advanced candidate at the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute.

1938 (July) reading Moses manuscript at 39 Elsworth Road, London; photographer: Willi Hoffer
Freud on Religion
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This mode of analysis, while it does succeed in locating some overlap between religious and non-religious use of objects, tells us very little, on the one hand, about the social basis for beliefs in gods, spirits, or supernatural beings, so central to definitions of religion, or, on the other, about transitional objects.

RELIGIOUS TRUTH

Some analysts argue that religion should not be expected to be true in the sense that science is, for example, and if religious institutions sometimes embrace poor science, these mistakes are only social problems that can easily be discarded. Once these social facts are discarded, then religion remains as a personal sense of awe, wonder, or spiritual longing. These definitions of religion are in part apologetic since religion is inextricable from a set of shared cultural practices. This point is so central to the argumentation of Freud’s critics today it bears further investigation.

Much as miracles were once thought to legitimize religious truth claims, today the equivalent is the truth-value that individual religious experiences are argued to represent (often labeled as “spirituality” or “mysticism”). It is no surprise that Sudhir Kakar, whose studies make the strongest case for this type of position, asks why Freud would find creativity in the artist but not in the mystic. The emerging scholarly analysis of mysticism recognizes the extent to which a mystical experience is completely determined by the social/cultural expectations of the person who has it (Kakar 1991).  

Scholars of religion would today be hesitant to use the term “mysticism” to the extent that it includes, just as the term “miracle” does, an evaluation that the experience is based on a factual encounter, and thus is both privileged over other types of religious events and not subject to analysis (Proudfoot 1985). The content of the mystical encounter is determined by the social norms that produce it, not by any reality “out there” that the person engages with. Ironically it is exactly on this topic, the role of internal fantasy in shaping experiences, where Freud’s insights are of such great value. His caution anticipates by a century the emerging scholarly consensus about exactly what religious experiences are evidence of.

Much more convincing are critics of Freud who point to the diverse roles that religious rituals fill. This point was raised by early critics of Freud and not given its due. The simple comparison between religious ritual and obsessional neurosis greatly oversimplifies rituals’ range and power. Rituals do much of the work of culture such as marrying people, conferring status, and instantiating cosmologies. Religious rituals in particular are often the cultural settings in which cultural beliefs are presented, clarified, challenged, and acted out.

Bettelheim observed that Margaret Mead, among many anthropologists, saw initiation rites as male attempts to take over female functions. Males are ambivalent towards their mothers and envy both the female sexual organs and their function. This “vagina envy” has attracted much less attention then penis envy, but may be central to rites constructed by men. Thus we find rites that induce male “menstruation” and many other rites that may less explicitly express envy over female ability to give birth and nurse.

One example of this type of rite is sacrifice. In her powerful studies of sacrifice traditions, Nancy Jay (1992) has explicated exactly how unconscious envy of females is acted out via both myths and rites of animal sacrifice. Women are forbidden to participate in these rites, which function socially and psychically to remake their sons into children of their fathers and male gods, displacing the human mothers. At the same time sacrificial rituals can result in powerful, sacred food produced by men, again a denial of the primordial dependence on the mother (Janowitz, forthcoming).

FANTASY SHAPING REALITY

Freud’s comparison between obsessive-compulsive behavior and ritual does not begin to plumb these depths, even while it may be compelling in some instances. Bettelheim also argued that rituals can have more useful roles, such as permitting people to explore identifications, relaxing social demands, and aiding in ego integration. Imagine if Freud had drawn on rituals of disenchantment, found primarily in oral religious traditions. Hopi boys, for example, are told as part of their initiation that the kachinas dancing at the rituals are not gods, but in fact their fathers and uncles dressed up. However, they are instructed not to tell the secret to the women and children.

Loewald astutely commented “repetitions” have been stressed more in psychoanalytic writings than repetition as a normal phenomenon (198097). He explains that “the passive reproduction of experience does present the opportunity for arriving at re-creative repetition, depending on a variety of internal and external conditions….” Transference repetitions in analysis as a vehicle of the therapeutic

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Bringing the Soul into Neuroscience: An Interview with Mark Solms

Mark D. Smaller

Freud, in his 1895 “Project for a Scientific Psychology,” attempted to join the emerging discipline of psychoanalysis with the neuroscience of his time…[The] neuron had only just been described, and Freud was forced—through lack of pertinent knowledge—to abandon his project. We have had to wait many decades before the sort of data which Freud needed finally became available.

Arnold Z. Pfeffer, M.D.
Neuro-psychoanalysis Web site: www.neuro-psy.org

Through the guiding support of the late Arnold Pfeffer, Mark Solms and his colleagues have gone beyond what even they would have imagined 20 years ago. Their contributions through neuro-psychoanalytic research are a testament to Freud’s original ideas.

The pioneering work of Mark Solms in dream research has redirected modern neuropsychological approaches to sleep and dreaming. Solms is the founding chair of the International Neuro-Psychoanalysis Society, director of the International Neuro-Psychoanalysis Centre in London, and director of the Arnold Pfeffer Center for Neuro-Psychoanalysis in New York, where he also serves on the board of the Neuro-Psychoanalysis Foundation. His main current academic affiliation is chair of neuropsychology at the University of Cape Town.

He has published over 300 journal articles and book chapters, and his books include The Neuropsychology of Dreaming, The Brain and the Inner World, and Clinical Studies in Neuro-Psychoanalysis. His Revised Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud will be published later this year.

Mark D. Smaller, Ph.D., is the director of the Neuro-Psychoanalysis Foundation in New York and London, and is on the board of the American Psychoanalytic Foundation.

The formative engagement of a distinguished scientist with Freud and the brain as the field of neuro-psychoanalysis grew exponentially is the subject of this interview with Solms.

Smaller: How long had you and Pfeffer been meeting?
Solms: I began commuting to New York around 1990. Those meetings began with a small group of analysts. We would invite leading neuroscientists to give presentations followed by discussions, much as we now have at the monthly meetings at the Pfeffer Center. It was a real meeting of minds. Our first speakers were selected by James Schwartz, who was working with Eric Kandel, the Nobel Prize Laureate.

Smaller: And your first International Congress?
Solms: It was held in London in 2000. Our seventh will be in L.A. this summer.

Smaller: What were the origins of your interest in neuroscience and psychoanalysis?
Solms: The origins of my interests probably began with a trauma. When I was about three years old, my older brother had a very serious head injury. He would have been about six. I was very close to him. We lived in a remote region of Southern Africa, an isolated village. We were isolated even as a family. We spoke English and everyone else in that village spoke German. My father was sort of the boss of town, which made us even more isolated. My brother was my only real friend. His accident had a devastating effect on me and the family. He was never the same after the accident. He had fallen from a roof deck, maybe five or six meters. He lost his personality.

I kept wondering how did it happen that my brother was no longer the same person? I discovered later in my own analysis that this trauma was probably also one of the main origins of my death anxiety—which has remained with me. That is also a neuro-psychoanalytic problem.

Smaller: How so?
Solms: I was preoccupied with this anxiety. How does it happen that your self is so bound up with your brain? If the self is the brain, then when your brain dies, there is no more self. So what happens to the immortality of the soul?

Smaller: You studied neuroscience at university?
Solms: Yes, but I was still interested in the self and the brain—and their connection. How are you your brain?

By the time I arrived at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, neuroscience was the obvious choice. That’s when I met this very impressive professor, Michael Saling. He was a neuroscientist, but he also knew something about the mind. I learned that maybe things were not so random. I became more interested in neuropsychology. But this was still neuroscience. You were still not allowed to ask things like, “How does the brain produce feelings?” The other stuff was so boring! To his great credit, Saling didn’t squash my curiosity in such questions.

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Mark Solms Interview

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Smaller: Had he read Freud?
Solms: Yes, but my interest in Freud began when I attended a seminar taught by a philosophy professor, Jean Pierre Delport. That’s when I first read Freud’s “Project for a Scientific Psychology.” It was mind-boggling—all the things that I was not learning in neuroscience were discussed there. How does the mind of a real person work? People have traumatic memories that affect the development of their minds, their behavior, their consciousness, and all of this must be reflected in the workings of their brains. It was incredible. Freud also wrote about dreams in the “Project.” I was like a kid in a toy shop.

Smaller: You began reading Freud?
Solms: I read “On Aphasia,” and then Saling and I wrote a paper that was published in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis [1986] titled “On Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience.” That paper was the turning point of my scientific life. Psychoanalysis became my whole way of thinking, especially after I read The Interpretation of Dreams.

Smaller: What was the link?
Solms: Psychoanalysis could provide what neuroscience was lacking—a science of the person, a natural science of subjectivity. I think that was consistent with Freud’s ideas. But I had to keep both sides going. By 1984 I began getting articles accepted in neuroscience journals.

Smaller: Things were moving.
Solms: Until 1985. Then Saling, much to my dismay, was offered a position in Melbourne and emigrated. I was in a lurch—lost scientifically. I am a bit of a lone ranger, a loner, but one always needs mentors to learn from.

Smaller: That isolated village again.
Solms: It was a frightening time. I was young and suddenly left in charge of the neuropsychology services in two hospital neurosurgery wards, one in Johannesburg and the other in Soweto. Jo’burg General’s neurosurgery ward had 40 beds, and Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto had about 80. I was seeing patients morning, noon, and night. Then they opened a rehab unit with both brain and spine injury patients. That was an important place for me because patients lived there for months, sometimes years, and I talked with them—really got to know them and learned about the impact of their injuries and their trauma on their lives.

Smaller: Your first clinical experience.
Solms: I talked with them and learned about their past relationships. This was also a form of research. Certain brain lesions created certain changes in moods, thoughts, and behavior. These lesions changed the real fabric of their mental and personal lives. These were mostly patients with strokes or brain injuries. The spinal injury patients served as a sort of control group. They had equivalent physical trauma, but not brain lesions. That was a big difference between the two groups. Their personalities did not change in the same ways as the brain patients, even with the same traumatic loss.

Smaller: And with stroke patients?
Solms: Different changes in certain areas of the brain meant different changes in their personalities. That was an incredible thing to witness. You could look at a brain scan of a patient and almost predict what kind of personality changes they would have. And this was not with just a few patients but with thousands.

Smaller: This was still apartheid South Africa.
Solms: In a first world country, a person gets a slight twitch in their eye and they run to the doctor. With these patients in Soweto, they were already blind by the time they came for care. It would have to be that extreme. These were very poor people who would rarely see a doctor.

I was deeply interested in them. I wanted to know their stories. I learned quickly what to pay attention to, what was idiosyncratic to the individual patient, and what was characteristic of their lesion site. I was learning about the structure of the mind.

Smaller: Subjective experience?
Solms: It was what had been so completely lacking in my academic training—the human experience. In South Africa moreover, if a man came with this kind of brain injury, it not only affected him but also the 14 members of his family who were depending on him.

Smaller: The academic neuroscientist became one concerned with the soul and the brain, and the humanity in his work—a good foundation to become a psychoanalyst.
Solms: Well, I was having problems in South Africa. Each year the army would call me up for conscription. Each year the head of the neurosurgery department wrote letters about how I was needed, that I was the only neuropsychologist at the hospital. Three million people were depending on us—the whole township. And they would defer my conscription. But finally they said enough was enough. They gave me a year to train a replacement. That’s when I began training Oliver Turnbull [co-author of The Brain and the Inner World].

Smaller: You went to London?

Smaller: How did you decide on London rather than New York?
Solms: I remember that in London I felt more personally understood than in New York. Also, they were still discriminating against non-medical applicants and London had nothing like this. There is a great irony about this.

Smaller: With the Arnold Pfeffer Center for Neuro-Psychoanalysis now being housed at the New York Institute?
Solms: Also because the greatest interest in my work began here in the U.S. There was no interest at all in London. They thought, “Why would an analyst be interested in the brain?”

Smaller: What about your clinical work?
Solms: I needed to do some psychotherapy at the local mental hospital, a real old Victorian asylum. And I went for my own analysis every day. And seminars at night.

After that I saw my two control patients.

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Education and Training in Psychoanalysis

Robert Michels

Psychoanalytic education and training have engendered a number of lively and interesting dialogues in recent years. Probably the most well known has arisen repeatedly since the earliest years of organized training programs. It concerns who should be accepted as candidates for psychoanalytic training, and what requirements are appropriate. This has been mistermed the "question of lay analysis." Initially it divided the profession and challenged Freud’s leadership; later it threatened the very existence of the American Psychoanalytic Association. Is psychoanalysis a branch of psychiatry, a subspecialty of the mental health professions, or a new perspective on the human mind far too precious to be relegated to the control of medicine and the health professions, thereby excluding the rich and imaginative contributions of scholars from the humanities and social sciences along with those of other empathic and creative individuals who come from a number of pathways? The question has been, and is, answered in a number of different ways by different groups in different settings, most often not by addressing the underlying issues, which I shall address momentarily, but rather as part of a solution to immediate problems of the supply of candidates, of the attitudes of the professions and society, and most of all of guilt concerns of the profession.

Other dialogues concerning training and education have considered re-evaluation of the training analyst system, 80 years after its birth. Should training analyses be considered an educational issue; should there be designated training analysts, and if so designated by whom and based on what criteria; should the training analysis be replaced by a personal analysis, what is the difference, and perhaps most specific and most contentious, what if an appropriate applicant for training is in analysis with an analyst who is not a training analyst?

There have also been discussions about curriculum. Should theory be taught historically or conceptually? Should theoretical pluralism be emphasized or marginalized? Should technique be taught as derived from theory, or theory as a tool employed in technique? Should analytic curricula include discussion of psychopathology, psychotherapy, or alternative treatments? What is the relevance of developmental psychology, neuropsychology, language and narratology, research, methodology of treatment evaluation, or applied psychoanalysis to the psychoanalytic curriculum?

Supervision is generally viewed as more important than the didactic curriculum and easier to discuss than the training analysis. There have been discussions of the appropriate focus of supervision—the patient, the supervisee, the therapeutic process or the supervisory process, the relation between teaching and evaluation, the boundary between treatment and supervision, and, related, the question of the reporting vs. non-reporting supervisors.

There has been interest in the relationship between education and evaluation, and particularly professional certification—its reliability, validity, impact on the profession, and impact on the public. Reasonable people have widely discrepant views: that certification is impossible, that it is essential to maintain professional standards, that it is essential to protect the public, that it is irrelevant to the essence of what psychoanalysis is, and that it is desirable if done appropriately, but that it is not yet feasible to do it appropriately.

UNASKED QUESTIONS

These are all important and interesting topics. For the most part they can be traced back to the 1920s and the development of the first systematic program of professional training at the Berlin Institute, followed by tensions between the Berlin and Vienna institutes, tensions that were then exported to the New World, along with the Berlin and Viennese analysts, and where they have continued to the present. I believe that there are important underlying questions that are not often articulated (in contrast to the derivative questions outlined above, which, to my taste, are too often discussed).

One fundamental underlying question is the basic goal of the process. Is it to train practitioners so that they can conduct psychoanalytic treatment in the community or is it to educate professionals to assure the continued growth and progress of psychoanalytic knowledge? If it is training, a primary concern is to assure the public of the quality of the graduates. They should be ethical, safe, and effective. It is very important not to graduate anyone who fails to meet these standards, even at the risk of burdening or even excluding some who may meet them but about whom, for one reason or another, it is difficult to be certain. More attention will be devoted to ensuring that the worst practitioner is not too bad, even at the cost of limiting the potential excellence of the best.

Professional socialization is as important as professional training—practitioners must accept the importance of peer standards and peer review, and recognize that revolutionary procedures or ideas are to be reviewed and approved by colleagues before the public is exposed to them.

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Interpreting Transference Action

Henry F. Smith

It is a curious feature of the history of psychoanalytic ideas that both sides of most controversies can be derived from Freud’s writings. Whether or not a particular author chooses to trace his lineage to Freud is consequently more often a matter of politics than scholarship. And this is no less true for controversies in contemporary technique. In this light, I would like to take up the now nearly worldwide focus on the analysis of the transference in the here and now and, in particular, the analysis of action of the transference.

In doing so, I do not mean to exclude the other side of this debate, which, of course, can also be derived from Freud, namely the analysis of what is sometimes called the extratransference. In fact, to speak of these as opposing points of view is misleading, as both are necessary to the analysis of the whole person, and even the most ardent advocates of the here and now, from the relational to the contemporary Kleinian, make room for the there and then in one form or another.

North American psychoanalysis was slow to join the trend toward the analysis of action in the here and now, because it was viewed as having a Kleinian taint. Such taints, like the one interpersonalism once held for ego psychology (and ego psychology still holds for the French), have been instrumental in solidifying schools and sects.

There were two critical moments in Freud’s career that laid the groundwork for the focus I have in mind, moments of clinical frustration. Frustration, if not outright failure, was always the impetus for Freud’s modifications of theory and technique. I am thinking, first, of his initial articulation of the transference in his postscript to the Dora case. Here, several years after Dora had left him, Freud (1905) tells us what he wishes he had said to her, and it foreshadows all contemporary emphases on the patient’s experience of the analyst in the here and now.

“Now,” Freud writes, “I ought to have said to her; it is from Herr K. that you have made a transference on to me. Have you noticed anything that leads you to suspect me of evil intentions similar . . . to Herr K.’s? Or have you been struck by anything about me or got to know anything about me which has caught your fancy, as happened previously with Herr K.?” Her attention would then have been turned to some detail in our relations, or in my person or circumstances, behind which there lay concealed something analogous but immeasurably more important concerning Herr K.” (p. 118).

Freud was clearly groping here for a way to convert his new discovery into an intervention that might have made sense to his young patient—and it may sound clumsy to our ears—but his emphasis on the actual person of the analyst has a peculiarly contemporary ring. We can hear its echo, for example, in the contemporary work of Gill (1982) and Schwaber (1983), as they both, from somewhat different epistemological positions, pursue the patient’s experience of the analyst’s participation in the transference. Schwaber, in fact, traces the lineage of her approach directly to this comment of Freud’s.

COMMITTED EXPERIENCE

A decade later in his papers on technique, Freud’s analytic focus was shifting from the recovery of memory toward viewing analysis as a “passionately committed experience,” as Friedman (1991, p. 564) has put it. Ironically, however, it was Freud’s very interest in the recovery of memory that led him at this time to his most articulate description of the role of action in the here and now when he noted that patients put into action what they do not want to remember (Freud 1914).
Freud: Found in Translation

Emmett Wilson, Jr.

Some years ago a brouhaha started about the Strachey translation of Freud's works, known as the Standard Edition. Some date the beginning of this chorus of criticism with Bruno Bettelheim's New Yorker article in 1982 that appeared later in book form as Freud and Man's Soul (1983). But the concerns had been brewing for years, even before Strachey's monumental work was finished. The controversy was about whether Freud was translated properly. Some claimed he wrote in natural, emotive language, and his elegant, moving German style showed his concern with how life was for each individual person and spoke to all of us. Strachey, so the critics claimed, always opted for a scientific tone. And so the controversy raged, with international meetings devoted to the question, as a considerable literature developed around the problem of translating Freud. In addition, the anticipated expiration of the copyrights led to talk of a new translation to replace the Standard Edition.

Strachey was specific: “The imaginary model which I have always kept before me is of the writings of some Englishman of science of wide education born in the middle of the 19th century.” And he emphasized the Englishness of his model. I feel that Strachey was not far off the mark in his portrayal of Freud in the guise of an English gentleman and Victorian man of science. Freud would have been, I think, quite pleased to have been taken for such a personage. Strachey's model amounts to an extrapolation of Freud's view of himself.

Emmett Wilson, Jr., M.D., Ph.D., is a child psychiatrist. He is on the editorial board of The Psychoanalytic Quarterly.

As Mendelsohn notes, Freud had been awarded Germany's most prestigious literary honor; the Goethe Prize, just some three months earlier. So much for his desire to be a popular author; he wanted to be known for his science. Much of the criticism of the translation has to do with the “scientistic” format that Strachey was said to have imposed on the texts. But Freud was ambitious and somewhat arriviste, and being a scientist was his way of achieving the success, rewards, and recognition that he coveted. The Project and the early pre-psychoanalytic writings are quite unambiguously “scientific.” Often, his supposedly homey, ordinary, emotive prose addressed to the common man is as hard and precise and clearly as a scientist can be.

Freud was deeply perplexed that his case reports resembled novels and short stories, but he was struggling with philosophical problems about the explanation of human behavior. It is a field that has come to be known as philosophical psychology with psychoanalysis as a prime example of a discipline that straddles both science and the humanities. Freud became painfully aware of some of these philosophical problems, and was puzzled by them, as have been philosophers who have turned to this issue since.

INCHOATE TEXT

Has Strachey's model really harmed our understanding of Freud? It is hardly comparable to Benjamin Jowett's stilted and often prudish translation of Plato, which presented Plato as a stuffy English gentleman, and did a grave injustice even though it helped to popularize the Dialogues. Yet, since we have always had the text of Plato and many other translations to rely on, there was no lasting harm done except perhaps to create a false image of Plato for the general, Greekless reader. Perhaps the same control could have been exercised for the Strachey translation. We have always had a German text with which to compare it.

Or have we? Only after a fashion, Strachey's work was pioneering as a major step toward establishing an eventual standard German edition. The critics never intended to minimize the enormous contribution Strachey made in pulling together, organizing, cataloguing, sorting out, and providing the historical framework for the whole corpus of Freud's psychological writings and the development of his theory. Even the limited and tentative attempt at producing an adequate German text of Freud, the Studienausgabe, resorted to translating Strachey's notes and editorial apparatus and incorporating them into the German text of that edition. The unfinished and inchoate state of the German editions is now common knowledge.

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As Grubrich-Simitis comments: “[T]he German-speaking reader, not being in this questioning, alien, and eccentric position with respect to the original words, as a rule remains unaware of these dimensions.”

Criticism of Strachey has become more muted, and a more reasoned approach has developed. There seems to be little danger now that anyone would attempt to bring out a new, definitive English translation to replace Strachey, before a definitive German text is established. Under the auspices of the British Institute of Psycho-Analysis, Mark Solms is preparing a revised version of Strachey’s Standard Edition, as well as the neuroanatomical writings. Some specific changes will be incorporated, such as the substitution of “drive” for “instinct,” but still the format and tone of the original Strachey translation, with many of its controversial aspects, will be preserved. Strachey would probably approve, for he refers to the Standard Edition as a “pioneering work, with all the inevitable errors and blunders that that involves.” On some points of translation we have come to different conclusions, though Strachey was often aware of the problems. And some of his choices may come to be accepted over time.

Partly in response to the criticism of the Standard Edition, along with the opportunism involved with the expiration of the copyrights, the Penguin Freud Project was put forward. Edited by Adam Phillips, a British analyst, it aims to present a literary Freud, who, like every other writer, is endlessly redescribable and endlessly re-translatable. Some see this as part and parcel of the move away from the “science” of psychoanalysis, as an attempt to revamp psychoanalysis as hermeneutic, as humanistic, placing Freud in a cultural context.

The verdict has not yet been reached on their work. But the French are, as usual, on to something in focusing on the nature of translation and the differences in their language and Freud’s. As the call for new translations of Freud is made, it is important to realize that we still have much to learn about Freud’s thought, theory, and his language. Translation may be the royal road to this deeper understanding. Translation requires thinking about every word, and discussing and thinking out possible different translations for the German original.

It leads to a detailed examination of the text itself. The new translations are indeed much more readable, much livelier, much less stilted, than Strachey’s, and most use a more colloquial, relaxed tone. This is helped not only by having a different translator but also by a different introducer, adding a certain sprightliness to each volume. The introductions range from the superficial to the pedantic. The presentation is attractive, in paperback with fanciful cover art, e.g., paintings by Magritte or Max Ernst. From an analytic standpoint the lack of acquaintance of the translators with the field in which they are translating is regrettable, sometimes amusing, as for example, avoiding the term “infantile” because the children referred to “are not infants.” But this dissonance to an analytic ear is a small price to pay for the relative lack of psychobabble and jargon. The trade-off is a freshness and generally a liveliness that is lacking in Strachey.

There are problems. The new translations are not necessarily a smoother read. There are many infelicities, along with the freshness. At times the translation leads to forced and distorted English. As one translator states, “The word choices I have made don’t…always make things easier for the reader or easier for the
Influence, as the literary critic, Harold Bloom, argued in his book, *The Anxiety of Influence*, is usually no simple matter of the wholesale incorporation of the thought of a precursor by a follower. On the contrary, as a Freudian perspective would indeed require, the influence of a strong precursor of the stature and power of Freud would necessarily involve creative misreadings on the part of the followers, who would display the marks of the influence of the strong precursor even as they wrestled with, reinterpreted, or attempted to reject that very influence.

Taking that as a given, it is probably not an exaggeration to say Sigmund Freud’s influence has been greater in the field of anthropology than in any other academic discipline—perhaps even including psychology (except insofar as the whole of that latter discipline can be seen as a concerted attempt to deny that Freud ever existed). Freud’s deconstruction of the sovereign subject of the Enlightenment, his thoroughgoing critique of the objective observer, of “the Transcendental Ego,” of the conscious self supposedly transparent to itself, had a parallel in the decentering of the Eurocentric perspective effected by the radical cultural relativism that was the central intellectual and ethical premise of founders of 20th-century anthropology. For figures such as Franz Boas and Emile Durkheim, who set modern anthropology on its course as a discipline, the recognition of the validity of great varieties of coherent lived worlds beyond the borders of the West served as the opening of a horizon in space just as the Freudian revolution revealed a vast unexplored psychic domain beyond the boundaries of consciousness and “reason.” At the same time, the spirit of bohemian rebellion, of the critique of bourgeois society, and of being an outsider even in one’s own culture characterized many who were captivated by both psychoanalysis and anthropology and linked them in a common but uneasily yoked enterprise.

A list of those eminent anthropologists throughout the 20th century who were explicitly influenced by Freud and psychoanalysis reads like a roll call of the titans of the field. There were, of course, those figures who, by virtue of being trained in, or at least practicing, both disciplines established a subfield of “psychoanalytic anthropology,” (while at the same time ensuring for themselves a somewhat marginal place in both disciplines). I have in mind such figures as Geza Roheim, Georges Devereux, Abram Kardiner, L. Bryce Boyer, and others, as well as Erik Erikson and Erich Fromm, who, as psychoanalysts, deeply immersed themselves in the study of culture. But even within the mainstream of 20th-century anthropology, one has only to think of Rivers, Malinowski, Meyer Fortes, and Victor Turner in Britain, Alfred Kroeber, Edward Sapir, Clyde Kluckhohn, A. I. Hallowell, Weston LaBarre, and many others in America, and Claude Levi-Strauss in France to be convinced that, whether they agreed with him or not, the thinkers who framed the theoretical course of modern anthropology took Freud seriously enough to wrestle with him in original and intellectually exciting ways. Clifford Geertz, too, arguably the most influential American cultural anthropologist of the last several decades, was certainly deeply engaged with and influenced by Freud, even though it may not be explicitly obvious: He did not name his most important book *The Interpretation of Cultures* for no reason.

**SOCIAL THEORISTS**

One can also turn in the present connection to those social theorists who, while not anthropologists, contributed concepts that entered into the intellectual discourse of anthropology at various stages of its development.
Anthropology
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Foucault, and, of course, Lacan, who played such a crucial role in the construction of contemporary cultural theorizing in many arenas, including anthropology, always regarded Freud as a major figure to be reckoned with. In America, some of the most important social theorists of the middle part of the century, including Robert Merton and especially Talcott Parsons, under whose tutelage so many of the leading anthropologists of the subsequent generation were trained, were very explicit in their debt to Freud and psychoanalysis.

The idea of “Culture” was anthropology’s great contribution to the intellectual life of the 20th century, just as the “Unconscious” was that of psychoanalysis. Cultural theory helped form and then dominate the rather extreme environmentalism and emphasis on learning, social experience, and external influences in the formation of human life, personality, and society that prevailed in various forms, including behaviorism and social psychology, through much of the century.

Moreover, despite the apparent waning influence of psychoanalytic thought one must bear in mind that the most recent wave of feminist theory, which had a profoundly transformative effect on contemporary anthropology, was deeply engaged with and influenced by psychoanalytic thinking. Among its most important voices has been that of analysts, such as Juliet Mitchell, Nancy Chodorow, Jessica Benjamin, Julia Kristeva, and many others who either were analysts or were immersed in a struggle with analytic thought. The same goes for post-colonial theorists, from Frantz Fanon to Homi Bhaba, whose works rely heavily on psychoanalysis and whose influence continues to ramify throughout contemporary cultural anthropology and the newer field of cultural studies, from which cultural anthropologists of the subsequent generation were trained, were very explicit in their debt to Freud and psychoanalysis.

Foucault, and, of course, Lacan, who played such a crucial role in the construction of contemporary cultural theorizing in many arenas, including anthropology, always regarded Freud as a major figure to be reckoned with. In America, some of the most important social theorists of the middle part of the century, including Robert Merton and especially Talcott Parsons, under whose tutelage so many of the leading anthropologists of the subsequent generation were trained, were very explicit in their debt to Freud and psychoanalysis.

The “postmodern” turn in contemporary anthropological thought, which involves a distrust of the authority of the “objective” ethnographic observer, exposes the power asymmetry inherent in the ethnographic situation. This places a great emphasis on the uncertainties inherent in writing itself, and seeks to further challenge the privilege of the Western observer in favor of dialogue with the Other that transforms (at the same time as it

So far I have been talking about cultural anthropology as if it were the whole of our field, but, of course, it is not. The idea of “Culture” was anthropology’s great contribution to the intellectual life of the 20th century, just as the “Unconscious” was that of psychoanalysis. Cultural theory helped form and then dominate the rather extreme environmentalism and emphasis on learning, social experience, and external influences in the formation of human life, personality, and society that prevailed in various forms, including behaviorism and social psychology, through much of the century. This trend helped fuel the transformations of psychoanalytic theory that began with the work of the so-called culturalists who, directly responding to the influence of cultural theory in anthropology, stressed the importance of social relationships and enculturation at the expense of the emphasis on the drives and on the biological grounding associated with Freud’s metapsychology.

THEORY OF EVOLUTION

But if culture was the key anthropological concept for much of its history as a discipline, that position was challenged more and more aggressively through the latter half of the century by the revitalization of the theory of evolution. Long cast into the shadows by its association with such unpopular ideas as eugenics, social Darwinism, and racism, biological explanations for human behavior came into their own again, beginning with the important revisions of William Hamilton in the ’60s that led to the development of the fields of sociobiology and then of evolutionary psychology, both of which rested squarely on neo-Darwinian evolutionary concepts. Hamilton’s ideas about kin selection and inclusive fitness made it possible to rethink social and group phenomena, as well as psychological concepts, from a point of view that assumed: first, that innate behavioral programs had been written into the human genome by natural selection during the long period during which we, Homo sapiens sapiens and our immediate ancestors lived as hunting and foraging bands; and, second, that these behaviors reflected the same pressures to survive, compete, and reproduce exhibited by the behavior of any other species, social or not.

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Homo sapiens sapiens
The traditional approach of psychoanalysis to aesthetics has been the same as to dreams: Discover the unconscious meaning behind the manifest content and translate this hidden meaning into words. Not surprisingly, the same unconscious motivations were found embedded in psychological symptoms, dreams, mythology, literature, and art.

What is artistic about art, however, is precisely what gets lost in translation into cognitive verbal content. What is artistic about art is what it does and how it does it. In the briefest of statements, it restores fullness to the bleached-out experience of everyday life, invigorating ordinary thought and perception with the coloration of fresh feeling and bringing a renewed wholeness to one’s sense of self.

How, then, can justice be done to what is uniquely creative about art? The answer, I suggest, is by focusing on form rather than content, perception rather than motivation.

The “meaning” of a picture is like meaning in metrical poetry. It lies less in the content of the ideas that can be extracted and served up than in the form in which physical sounds and irregular accents of words play across the regular beat of the meter. Nonverbal art deals with the transmutation of external arrangements of color, line, tone, and rhythm into internal emotional meanings.

Accordingly, my approach to psychoanalytic aesthetics (Rose 1980, 1987, 1996, 2004-a, 2004-b, unpublished) shifts the focus from content to form, and from motivation to reality and perception. It holds to an open model of the organism; it views art as evolving within a fluid reality, supporting an adaptive, biological function: growth-enhancing and expanding cultural and historical perspectives.

CO-EXISTENCE OF TENSION AND RELEASE

How does art promote life? It aids the mind in constantly re-sorting intermingled currents of subjective imagination and objective knowledge, feeling and cognition. In psychoanalytic terms, primary and secondary processes are in constant interplay and, in the process, generating the tension and release of affect. This is in contrast to received truth that (1) growth requires secondary process to replace primary process (where Id was, Ego shall be) and (2) that the function of art is to smuggle in forbidden fantasy guilt-free.

Aestheticians point out certain characteristics of the feelings associated with the aesthetic experience. They note the co-existence of hyperacuity and tranquility, force and calm, vitality and ease, energy and repose. In my view, this reflects a common dynamic in the structure of both art and affect: tension and release.

From the side of art, a visual artist, like a composer, knows how to enhance the expressive qualities of tension and release inherent in ordinary perception and how to express them more energetically and clearly to highlight the dramatics of everyday experience. For example, in art oblique lines or rectangular or oval shapes are more tension producing; horizontal or vertical lines or square or spherical shapes are more stable and tension releasing. In music, delaying resolution raises tension. Some ways of doing this are through ornamentation, the minor mode, key modulations, and dissonance.

From the side of the viewer of art, sensitivity to patterns of tension and release is the most elementary attribute of perception. It accounts for having an immediate emotional reaction to stimuli and is rooted in a biological necessity: An organism must make an on-the-spot appraisal of the outside world’s perceived hostility or friendliness in order to know whether to advance, withdraw, or wait and see. Such affective perception is the first and most basic response to the dynamic aspects of the external world, that is, its perceived qualities of tension and release, and how to interpret them in the light of knowledge and imagination.

Susan Langer points out that art offers an objective image of the subjective experience of human feelings. “The establishment and organization of tensions is the basic technique in projecting the image of feeling, the artist’s idea, in any medium…. [It leads to] an isomorphy of actual organic tensions and…virtual created tensions.” (Langer 1967, p. 164).

The near perfect fit between the attunement of art to one’s own feelings and one’s responsive resonance to aesthetic forms leads to an evolving interplay between art and recipient. This may proceed in ways that the author never intended so that the receiver becomes, in a sense, a co-creator. (T.S. Eliot considered that some of the meanings attributed to his poetry were superior to anything he had in mind.)
Nonverbal Art

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LINKING FORM AND FEELING

In this regard, several considerations are notable.

First, the correspondence between objective aesthetic forms and internal feelings is so close that, I believe, it allows the viewer of art to create a preconscious illusion that art provides a responsive, witnessing presence. As in any intimate encounter (love or treatment, for example), the viewer is licensed to feel more consciously what was always latent but unformed and inexpressible.

Second, such implicit “permission” amplifies emotional responses. They range from the present back to the remote past. Among the most significant of the latter is the experience of affective signaling that takes place in the holding environment between parent and infant. Ideally, this was geared toward the buildup and resolution of tension in a finely tuned dance of the mother’s attunement and the infant’s responsiveness. This promoted a graded differentiation of feelings rooted in the very beginnings of a sense of self.

Art, too, provides a framework of reliably balanced tension and release, allowing affects to build up with intensity and offering the opportunity for their further differentiation. This is an illustration of how art is biologically rooted: It continues the affect-regulating function of early mothering; it helps elaborate transformations of affect, on higher, abstract levels, of the same resonating emotional responsiveness that existed in the beginning.

Third, other aspects of its biological rootedness have to do with its contribution to orientation and sense of wholeness. For instance, it can be shown that, insofar as aesthetic form stimulates and magnifies the normal interplay of primary and secondary processes. For instance, it can be shown that, insofar as aesthetic form stimulates and magnifies the normal interplay of primary and secondary processes, it helps elaborate transformations of affect, on higher, abstract levels, of the same resonating emotional responsiveness that existed in the beginning.

What do I mean by this “interplay”? Primary process forms (such as condensation, displacement, coexistence of opposites) are subjected to the delayed discharge imposed by secondary process. This raises the normally subliminal pre-stages of perception into full awareness; reflection becomes possible. Consider Picasso’s depiction of multiple spatial perspectives simultaneously.

In music, experts have pointed to the coexistence of opposites during moments of stasis and movement in late Beethoven music. They seem outside time and space. How is this brought about? In the Adagio movement of the “Sonata in C-Minor, Opus 111,” for example, a combination of accelerated motion, rhythmic diminution, and minimal harmonic action leads to blurring of any distinction between rapid movement and stasis. They condense into a “shimmering, sonic barrier” (Solomon 2003, pp. 207-209).

Language, of course, has always been the privileged centerpiece in the analytic theory of sublimation, namely, the replacement of thing-presentations and primary process by word-presentations and secondary process. Nonverbal art, however, offers a further perspective, namely, on the nonverbal sublimation of affect.

AFFECT CODES

How might this work? I speculate as follows: Nonverbal sublimation of affect may begin with the artist projecting unique, personally expressive body-image affect codes of somatic tension and release. They constitute actual implicit motion. With talent and know-how the artist transmutes and intensifies them in the artwork. The perpetual implicit motion of the artist’s expressive body images (neural mappings of his/her virtual body as a whole) makes the picture come “alive” with affective tension and release. “Embodied” in the art, they constitute virtual implicit motion.

The concordance between the actual implicit motion in the tension and release of the artist’s affect and the virtual implicit motion embedded in the tension and release of aesthetic form is a key to the artist’s sublimation of nonverbal affect: It transmits the artist’s feelings. It also generates the viewer’s own affective response. The latter may or may not be in accordance with the artist’s affect. It may range from empathic to antipathetic or be a complex combination depending on the viewer’s own psychodynamics. In short, the viewer becomes “co-creator.”

Nonverbal art thus suggests a working definition for the nonverbal sublimation of affect—one that testifies to the fundamental role of motion in both emotional expression and emotional response. It builds on the neuroscience concept that second-order neural maps exist initially in nonverbal form that can be simulated by imagination but are also capable of conversion into language.

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Most of the key concepts in Freudian psychoanalysis were either adapted from fin de siècle psychiatry or invented by Freud himself. When Laplanche and Pontalis surveyed these terms in their remarkable lexicon, first published in French in 1967, “gender” was not on their list. It is not indigenous to psychiatry or psychoanalysis, but came from 1960s feminists who, in the era of structuralist theorizing, knew that for linguists sex is not in any simple way referenced in the gender of nouns. There are Indo-European languages with three genders—feminine, masculine, and neuter—and languages with only two; languages in which la lune is feminine and le soleil masculine, while in others the genders are reversed for no obvious reason; languages in which a girl and a woman are both neuter; for example, das Maedchen and das Weib. Gender, feminists understood, is categorization, culturally shaped and culturally shaping.

But by the late 1960s, there was also a growing recognition of what feminists called “gender” among psychoanalysts, particularly those engaged in empirical research. Robert J. Stoller published his enormously influential *Sex and Gender* in 1968, but John Money and his sexologist colleagues at Johns Hopkins had begun the investigations that culminated in *Man and Woman, Boy and Girl* (1972) in the 1950s. These writers were, in turn, indebted to a critique of Freud’s views on female (not male) development that began in the 1930s with essays by Karen Horney, Ernst Jones, and Sylvia Payne, and continued in the 1940s with contributions by Gregory Zilboorg and Phyllis Greenacre, all of whom argued against the idea that femaleness begins at puberty when a girl abandons focus on clitoral sensation for vaginal. Horney and Jones argued for “primary femininity” and an inborn maturational program headed for heterosexuality, which implied a paradigm shift away from Freud’s general focus on masculinity and his idea that femininity is, basically, a retreat from masculinity governed by envy of the masculine phallus.

Although feminists of the “second wave” embraced this paradigm shift, to which they had also contributed so much, they did not usually accept the new analytic biological emphasis, but, rather, adopted the “cultural Freudianism” of Horney and others (including cultural anthropologists like Margaret Mead) who had explored the influence of culture on (particularly female) development. “Gender” was the word that had emerged by the 1970s to refer to the components of femininity and masculinity that growing up in a language and a culture adds to one’s biological or innate femaleness and maleness. So, despite the contributions of analyst critics of Freud, the slow importation of “gender” into psychoanalysis is a case of identification with the aggressor; for gender was the leading feminist weapon with which Freud’s views on female psychology were criticized. Paradigmatically, Simone de Beauvoir had insisted in *Le deuxième sexe* (1949) that “woman is not born, but made,” which meant that anatomy is not destiny as Freud seemed, most of the time, to argue and which the “primary femininity” position actually perpetuated.

Even though Freud was the chief target of both psychoanalytic and feminist critique and even while his bias was being quite definitively repudiated, he was also, paradoxically, a great inspiration for his own overthrow. At the end of his 1920 case study of the 18-year-old female homosexual, Freud had clearly distinguished physical sexual characteristics from mental sexual characteristics of the sort known as Weiblichkeit and Männlichkeit, and he had gone on to note—very radically—that there is no fixed relation (including causal relation) between these two ingredients of sexuality and the third, type of object choice. He was also clearly aware that femininity and masculinity have not just biological, but sociological, and psychosocial dimensions and that, as technical terms, they were seldom clearly used. Freud was also, throughout his

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Gender

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oeuvre, an exponent of universal primary bisexuality—despite the fact that this concept should have made him question his privileging of masculinity (his “phallocentrism,” as Ernest Jones called it). But in his three late essays dealing with female sexuality, Freud had tilted more and more toward consideration of the “psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes,” and seemed to retreat from his more radical positions. Karen Horney, Clara Thompson, and other analysts who influenced de Beauvoir had both protested this tilt and repudiated Freud’s contempt for arguments supporting the equality of women. But the early critics did not invent a term to compass mental sexual characteristics (both femininity and masculinity) or to link these to sociocultural influences as later feminists did with gender (embracing both femininity and masculinity).

PENDULUM SWINGS

Like the nature vs. nurture binary, to which it is related, the sex vs. gender binary, has for its whole career been wrapped in controversy and subject to pendulum swings. Until the 1970s, the determinative role of “sex” (biological femaleness and maleness, not any intersex condition) was the chief site of questioning the binary. Among analysts, the primary femininity argument was as important in that questioning as were any emphasis on gender identity (the term for conscious and unconscious awareness of being one sex or the other) or any emphasis on gender role (the term for behavior, particularly in relation to other people and social norms that evaluate gender; promoting or denoting behaviors). Robert Stoller, for example, accepted the primary femininity argument, but proposed that both females and males develop pre-ocedipally a core gender identity, that is, a sense of “I am female” or “I am male,” which usually, but not always, accords with their physical sexual characteristics.

But among feminists, the determinative influence of sex was usually downplayed or rejected, and gender identity became virtually synonymous with sexual identity. They stressed children’s early identifications with one parent or the other and the impact of differences in child-rearing and parental attitudes toward female and male children, and they explored societal divisions of labor; particularly the sexism reflected in those divisions. Their critique of psychoanalysis often focused on Freud’s notion of penis envy in women, which, as noted, had served Freud as the main explanation for why girls, for whom the mother is the first love object, as she is for boys, usually turn to a male object. To the claim that girls seek in their male objects the penis they do not have, and that this same lack and desire move them to desire a male child, feminists countered that girls envy and desire the penis because it is valued and privileged generally by phallocentric culture—that is, by the culture of male narcissism, known sociologically as “patriarchy.”

In the 1970s and 1980s, when gender was being explored by feminists and imported into psychoanalysis, the theoreticians most important to psychoanalysis were feminists who actually trained as psychoanalysts, chiefly Juliet Mitchell in England and Nancy Chodorow in America. In France, too, feminists like Julia Kristeva sought training, but they were much more influenced by Jacques Lacan than by either Freud or Freud’s critics like Horney. Their critique was, so to speak, psycholinguistic and emphasized that gender is part of the unconscious that is shaped like a language.

While psychoanalysis was being challenged by feminists without and within on the sex vs. gender axis, the Gay Liberation Movement focused on the third ingredient of sexuality Freud had articulated, choice of object. With astonishing swiftness, this challenge highlighted a newly named prejudice, “homophobia,” and accomplished a category shift: Homosexuality was depathologized, and dropped from the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1973. But, ironically, the newly important concept of gender came to the fore in a new pathology a decade later, gender identity disorder. Debate still surrounds this GID, with its emphasis on whether a child’s or an adult’s gender identity is dysphoric or not, and the debate has been engaged and extended by transsexuals and transvestites questioning the way in which they have been interpreted, as homosexuals and bisexuals had in the early 1970s.

GENDER-BENDING

This clinical development and debate had some impact on feminist theorists who, from the 1980s forward, were, however, chiefly influenced by object relations theory, by French feminism, and by both European and American versions of postmodernism. “Gender” began to take on new meanings, with an emphasis on how gender is scripted (or narrativized) and/or performed. In a social era of widespread gender-bending (both unconscious and conscious) and changing social roles (like parenting for non-heterosexuals of all sorts), the word began to designate a goal or something like an ego ideal, an identity either socially constructed or individually constructed (a matter of choice of gender). But at the same time, the very idea of normal gender development, or, to use the more prescriptive term, normativity, came under attack as vehemently as had, in earlier times, specific gender norms. Gender, which had once functioned as a liberationist tool to free people from “anatomy is destiny,” began to be seen by some postmodernist theorists as needing a revolution or at least a
Freud as a Cultural Historian

Peter J. Loewenberg

Psychoanalysis is now inseparable from Western culture. Today a psychoanalytic sensibility has a central place in the humanities, theater, film, literature, art, and the media. A typical 19th century two-volume Life and Times...biography, as John Morley wrote of William E. Gladstone (1903), that never mentions he was a flagellant, or Dumas Malone's Thomas Jefferson (6 vols., 1948-1981), with no reference to the body, sexuality, dreams, or articulated private fantasies, is unacceptable and virtually unthinkable today. The reading of a typical 19th century discipline, combining both self-reflection and science, but basing itself on a unique and different process of inquiry than either the natural or the cultural sciences. Psychoanalysis is a discipline of a new kind, a 21st century discipline, combining both self-reflection and science, but basing itself on a unique and different process of inquiry than either the natural or the cultural sciences. “The psycho-analytic mode of thought,” said Freud, “acts like a new instrument of research.” In psychoanalysis two people together create a secure emotional field for the exploration of the latent and least understood meanings of fantasies, dreams, interactions (including their diologic encounter), the body, behaviors, and life itself. Freud patterned the interpretation of dreams after the hermeneutic model: “Interpreting’ a dream implies assigning a ‘meaning’ to it.”

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As in so much else, including our clinical work, psychoanalysts exist in a space of tension and ambiguity between our subjectivity and what we choose to define as outside “reality.”

HUMAN PROGRESS DUBIOUS

Freud was a skeptic about both the potential of humankind and of our culture. His conservative pessimism regarding changing the single individual and the therapeutic efficacy of analysis was a constant from Studies in Hysteria in 1895, when he modestly postulated the aim of settling for “common unhappiness” (gemeines Unglück), to late in his life, when in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” in 1937, he cautioned “in the end the difference between a person who has not been analyzed and the behaviour of a person after he has been analyzed is not so thorough-going as we aim at making it and as we expect and maintain it to be.”

Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897) and his Basel colleague, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), were, with Freud, isolated dissenters from the 19th century ideology of progress—the idea implicit in linear time as progression, that the human condition and our civilization are getting ever better. Burckhardt was one of Freud’s favorite authors. He had six of Burckhardt’s books in his personal library, and he often refers to the pleasure they gave him. Significantly, during the most lonely and depressed period of his self-analysis, when his sole transfere object and mirroring comfort was the Berlin ear, nose, and throat specialist Wilhelm Fliess, Freud was reading Burckhardt: “For relaxation I am reading Burckhardt’s History of Greek Civilization which is providing me with unexpected parallels. My predilection for the pre-historic in all its human forms has remained the same.” A week later he writes Fliess, “I am deep in Burckhardt’s History of Greek Civilization.”

The cultural pessimism expressed in Burckhardt’s letters, lectures, and essays is one of the reasons for the resonance Freud found in Burckhardt as an historian of culture. A patriotic citizen of Basel, a small Swiss republican cantonal democracy at the juncture of France and Germany, Burckhardt was a skeptic regarding the “progressive” virtues of nationalism, the state, and modern industrialism.

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Burckhardt expressed his pessimism about the Enlightenment fantasy of a perfectible human nature: “The great harm was begun in the last century, mainly through Rousseau, with his doctrine of the goodness of human nature.”

For a time, the “present” was literally synonymous with progress, and the result was the most ridiculous vanity, as if the world were marching toward a perfection of mind or even morality…. as to “moral progress”….there is none to be found….it is relevant to the life of the individual and not to whole epochs. If, even in bygone times, men gave their lives for each other; we have not progressed since.

In Burckhardt’s correspondence with his Prussian friend von Preen, he displayed an uncanny foresight into the terrorist dictators and their drab totalitarian police states of the 20th century. He envisioned:

high purposefulness of the military machine worked out to the last details…. The latter is bound to become the model of existence. It will be most interesting for you, my dear Sir, to observe how the machinery of State and administration is transformed and militarized; for me—how schools and education are put through the cure…. I have a suspicion that, for the time being, sounds completely mad, and yet I cannot rid myself of it: that the military state will have to turn “industrialist.” The accumulations of beings, the mounds of men in the yards and factories, cannot be left for all eternity in their need and thirst for riches; a planned and controlled degree of poverty, with promotion and uniforms, starting and ending daily to the roll of drums…. The picture I have formed of the terribles simplifiers who are going to descend upon poor old Europe is not an agreeable one; and here and there in imagination I can already see the fellows visibly before me.”

In fact, he did not think we were better than the Greeks. He did not subscribe to ideas of human moral progress or development, neither in individuals nor in epochs. He always admired antiquity, indeed he considered the ancient Greeks as our cultural betters. Freud made an explicit comparison of our society to ancient Hellas with reference to the toleration and educational function of homosexuality: “We surely ought not to forget that the perversion which is most repellant to us, the sensual love of a man for a man, was not only tolerated by a people so far our superiors in civilization as were the Greeks [einem uns so sehr kulturüberlegenen Volk wie den Griechen], but was actually entrusted by them with important social functions.”

Can any of us who have witnessed the wars and atrocities, Holocausts and genocides of the 20th century doubt that Burckhardt and Freud were right about the lack of moral progress in ourselves and our civilization?

I believe my esteemed friend Jonathan Lear has Freud’s view of history wrong when he attributes to Freud the idea that “history is presumed to be progressive…a triumphal story of human progress…” Freud was an extreme skeptic about human moral progress.

RELIVING THE PAST

There is a striking congruence between Freud and the methods of the cultural historian. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) espoused the idea that the historian is himself the primary instrument of research, that he uses himself as the perceptor and interpreter of data. Dilthey understood that the historian relives the past in his own mind. What makes Dilthey so strikingly modern to us is the stress he laid on historical knowledge as an inner experience of the historian. Dilthey argued that the historian’s understanding [Verständnis] is based on his inner relationship [innere Verhältnisse] to his subject of research, and this relationship is possible through re-creation [Nacharbeit]) and identification [Nacherleben]. Historians face the practical task “of the inner reliving of the development of individuation” [innerlich…diesen Aufgang zur Individuation zu durchleben]. He called on historians to place themselves mentally in the historical situation [Sichineinversetzen]. “On the basis of this placing of oneself in the situation, this transposition, the highest form in which the totality of mental life can be effective in understanding, arises—imitation or identification.” Dilthey was the earliest conceptualizer of the use of sympathy [Mitfühlen] and empathy [Einfühlung] as tools of cognition in historical research.

R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943) was Dilthey’s prophet in the Anglo-Saxon world. His work and method is particularly congenial to the psychoanalytic mode of experience because it highlights the tools of emotional empathy and identification which lead to intellectual insight of “how it really was” (Ranke). Collingwood wrote:

All history is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian’s own mind… It is not a passive surrender….it is a labour of active and therefore critical thinking. The historian not only re-enacts past thought, he re-enacts it in the context of his own knowledge and therefore, in re-enacting it criticizes it, forms his own judgment of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern in it.
Collingwood was aware of Freud and saluted him as “the greatest psychologist of our age.”

To theorize elegantly about history is one thing. To apply a theory intelligently so that it yields solid results is quite another. With Collingwood we may see, not only a philosopher of history conceptualize an historical theory of epistemology, but we may observe a working historian doing his research and making discoveries. It is instructive to see how Collingwood operationalized his empathetic theory of historical research. He tried to reason as the Roman strategists did, then reconstruct the past in his own mind and test his fantasy by empirical research. His research was on the purpose and function of Hadrian’s Wall, a 73-mile-long structure built across the narrowest part of England on a line from the River Tyne on the North Sea to the Solway Firth on the Irish Sea, maintained by the Romans between 122 and 383 A.D. Collingwood reversed the previous scholarship by first creating a problem where there was previously only accepted dictum—that this wall, as other Limes at the extremities of the Roman Empire, was a military fortification designed to keep out barbarian invaders. Collingwood asserted that he could not imagine this. His subjective fantasies and feelings led him to his problem:

He placed himself in the mental and intellectual position of the Roman generals and engineers who designed and built the wall. He immersed himself in their situation, seeking the “inward experience” of making the past alive in him. He maintained that the historian makes discoveries by rethinking the thoughts of his subjects in his own mind:

The historian of politics or warfare, presented with an account of certain actions done by Julius Caesar, tries to understand these actions, that is, to discover what thoughts in Caesar’s mind determined him to do them. This implies envisaging for himself the situation in which Caesar stood, and thinking for himself what Caesar thought about the situation and the possible ways of dealing with it. The history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian’s own mind.

If one succeeds in arranging the confused heap of fragments, each of which bears upon it an unintelligible piece of drawing, so that the picture acquires a meaning, so that there is no gap anywhere in the design and so that the whole fits into the frame—if all these conditions are fulfilled, then one knows that one has solved the puzzle and that there is no alternative solution.

Historians use the present as an entry to the past, as do psychoanalysts who begin with the presenting complaint. This is consistent with the historical method of the great medievalist, Marc Bloch (1886-1944), who pursued a “prudently retrogressive method of research,” by moving backward from the present to origins. He taught: “The knowledge of the present bears…immediately upon the understanding of the past…. For the natural progression of all research is from the best (or least badly)

When disturbance ripened into war, when large forces from the north advanced upon the Wall and attempted (as no doubt they did, not always unsuccessfully) to penetrate it, we cannot imagine that the Roman cohorts actually lined up on the rampart-walk to repel them, still less that Hadrian’s engineers ever contemplated such a proceeding [italics mine].

Collingwood tells us that he is employing his empathy in making a reconstruction. He explicitly says that his tool of cognition is his power of imagination, his ability to get into the mind of Hadrian’s engineers and, if a given pattern of thought is “unthinkable” for them in his mind, this fantasized implausibility is for him an important historical datum. Collingwood is using his educated and disciplined fantasy as a primary dimension of historical research.

PUZZLE SOLVING

In Collingwood’s research and interpretation on the problem of the Wall, extending over two decades, we see the historian’s procedure of reconstruction of the past by inferring the thoughts and feelings of particular men in the past from historical evidence in the present. It is a process of immersion in their problems and identification with their solutions, a practice analogous to puzzle solving, which in turn gives rise to new questions. Collingwood sought confirmatory evidence from residues in the present, much as an analyst would.

His archeological research established that there was no trench in front of the Wall. Indeed, the Wall top was only 15 feet from the ground. How do we know that Collingwood was right? Of course, we do not know for a certainty. Indeed we may be certain that in due course his view will be revised. But our conviction is based on the fact that for now the pieces fit. Puzzle solving, incidentally, is a methodological smile used by Freud:

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At What Cost?
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PROLIFERATING CLINICS

London was a latecomer to the free clinics (1926), and it was relatively heterogeneous. But local psychoanalysts saw this as a benefit in a heavily principled society like the British Psychoanalytic under Ernest Jones, and maybe this is why the London Clinic for Psychoanalysis still survives today. Since the early 1920s, the British analysts had visited foreign clinics and also invited Berliners like Melanie Klein to join up. By 1926, the British Society’s goal was to build a clinic quickly, learning from Berlin and Vienna while managing their own approach to cases and research. Analysts like Sylvia Payne and Edward Glover, and especially Barbara Low, stayed close to their IPA partners, maintaining the clinics’ child and adult programs. All staff treated one patient daily at the Gloucester Place facility or, as in the other societies, provided an alternative but equivalent amount of service or money to the institute.12 Freud was delighted. “Although absent from the opening of the Clinic tomorrow,” Freud wrote to Jones, referring to the clinic’s ribbon-cutting ceremony, “I am all with you and feel the importance of the day.”

Erik Erikson, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Bruno Bettelheim, Alfred Adler; Otto Fenichel, Melanie Klein, Anna Freud, Wilhelm Reich, Helene Deutsch, Grete and Eduard Bibring, Paul Scholder, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann—these were just some of the free clinic analysts who later fanned out across the Western world, some carrying the torch of progressivism and others concealing it. Today they are known for their theoretical revisionism and for the many ways in which they followed, transformed, or broke away from classical Freudian theory. But in the 1920s and early 1930s, the same analysts saw themselves as brokers of social change for whom psychoanalysis was a social mission, a challenge to conventional political traditions. They were a spirited group who found no antagonism between the macropolicy and microclinical levels (a conflict that characterizes and confuses practice all too often today). Not surprisingly, the ideology and organization of their free clinics echoed the era’s own modernist ideology—women’s right to vote, the focus on child health and welfare, the vast re-housing projects—in postwar Austria and Germany. Just as significant, the psychoanalysts’ priorities, their concern for the relationship between social infrastructure and personal psychology, magnified their accomplishment. In the 1920s, psychoanalysis was as progressive a sociocultural movement as the art, music, and architecture of the era. Freud’s own interest, his appreciative insistence on being included in the free clinics, has to be understood within that historical context but also applied right now.

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Freud on Religion

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process are an example of this” (1980:91). In the “creative repetitions” the patient is able to work through what is remembered, arriving at a “moment of generating new organization” (1980:94).

The question then becomes: How is it that cultural events which are highly structured and performed repeatedly are able to have such social and personal efficacy? The answer anthropologists have given, which offers rich ground for revising Freud’s thought on religion, is the inherently dual-aspectedness of rituals: Their transformational dimension is inseparable from their “hyper-structure” (Parmentier 1984). That is, in order to be socially effective, each ritual must be recognizable as an instance of a larger type of ritual based on a prior successful model (a human marriage copying a divine union or a legal ruling copying a precedent) in order to be recognizable and effective. Psychic change can be viewed as an intriguing sub-category of this process, where the patient must own up to her role in creating external reality through her own transformations (transferences) instead of simply being a passive person encountering “reality.”

At every step we can reject specific details of Freud’s analysis of religion, but still leave his basic approach to the role of religion in culture intact. Some aspects of collective religious ritual are illuminated by comparison with the fantasies and defenses of obsessive individuals. Myths can be studied as collective dreams.

At the same time, Freud’s conceit that he had anticipated and deflected all possible attempts to rework his analysis of religion is absurd. Certainly the idea that psychoanalysis will replace religion seems today like a plot for a Woody Allen movie and not an idea that will replace religion, seems today like a plot for collective dreams.

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Notes

1 Katz 1984 is the classic statement of this position.

Bibliography


Future of Psychoanalysis

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traditional reluctance of psychoanalytic organizations to proselytize, or even to seek favorable publicity for what we have to offer, but the sense of crisis regarding training and practice, of which many speak these days, has mobilized a new attitude towards those endeavors.

It is hard to predict what our efforts to reach out to academia, to influence mental health delivery systems, and to present our ideas and results in the forum of public opinion will be able to achieve. It can only be helpful that more and more thoughtful and articulate psychoanalysts want to teach students at all levels and are willing to speak and write about our knowledge and achievements to those who need to know more about what psychoanalysis has to offer.

My own appraisal is a guarded one. I believe the high water mark psychoanalytic treatment reached some years ago was an artifact of its time. Effective alternative treatments did not exist, and our competition in those days was mainly among ourselves. That is no longer the case and will never be again. However, I expect psychoanalytic therapy, and its psychotherapeutic offspring, will actually gain in popularity in areas of the world where it is relatively new, a phenomenon I have observed at first hand through the activities of the International Psychoanalytical Association, even as it may contract in other loci.

Furthermore, despite the problems we face in this country and elsewhere, I am absolutely convinced that psychoanalytic therapy will survive and continue to develop. It will never be a treatment form suitable for and available to the majority of people with emotional problems. Surely we can agree that in the past it was attempted in many cases where it proved ineffective because in those days nothing better was on the scene.

I do believe it will continue to flourish as a specialized approach appealing to a knowledgeable minority who can appreciate its unique potential to help them with their lives and their troubles. Among them will be many mental health practitioners who realize that personal analysis and training will enable them to render more effective treatment, whether it is psychoanalysis proper or psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Others will be those educated individuals who are willing and able to invest in the best available treatment for their emotional problems. In consequence, a cadre of dedicated practitioners will continue to work, and to teach those interested to learn our arcane specialty, in its various evolving forms.

The door Sigmund Freud opened into our understanding of our mental life and its vicissitudes can never be closed again, and the helping profession that his discoveries created will endure, in spite of its internal disputes and external obstacles.
Mark Solms Interview
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Smaller: What group did you train with in London?
Solms: The Freud group. I was immersed in Freud, but that was all I had read. I knew nothing of other theorists. I was interviewed by two analysts, one Kleinian and one Freudian, for my training. The Freudian was Clifford Yorke, a good bloke, and he became my analyst.

Smaller: And the training?
Solms: My analytic training was disorienting, bewildering. I felt like the green kid from the countryside. I shut up in class, while everyone else discussed Winnicott, Bion, Klein. Can you imagine me just sitting there and shutting up?

Smaller: Can’t imagine!
Solms: But I did and I learned. Karen and I also began seeing neurological and surgical patients at the Royal London Hospital. The records of those patients became our book—Clinical Studies in Neuro-Psychoanalysis. I was also able to conclude my dream research at that time.

Smaller: What was different about seeing analytic patients?
Solms: I think previously it was as if I had found a violin in the jungle. I knew how to play but did not have the correct theory or technique. The analytic training was like learning from a proper violin teacher. I learned how to think about what I was doing and link it with what others had done before me, and learn from their experience.

Smaller: You began integrating the two disciplines.
Solms: In 1990, Morton Ostow invited a small group to meet me. Ostow had written an inspiring paper back in the 1950s in the Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis Quarterly about neuroscience and psychoanalysis. After I had read that, I contacted him. So Ostow invited me over, a real act of kindness, to meet with this small group, maybe 20 analysts. One of them was Arnold Pfeffer. I was to present my work with brain injured patients. We met at the New York Academy of Medicine.

That meeting was terrific. Pfeffer asked if I would take over the monthly meetings he had begun at the New York Institute. I could engage with more analysts. Despite my junior status, I gave a whole year of lectures once a month. Karen and I presented our work with individual patients and their transcripts.

Smaller: Similar to what you are doing each month with Mount Sinai psychiatric residents?
Solms: Yes. We presented transcripts of sessions with five patients with left and five with right side hemisphere lesions, and then discussed differences.

Smaller: The Arnold Pfeffer Center [through support of the Pfeffer Family Foundation] now emerged from those meetings?
Solms: Pfeffer set up a committee to run the lectures and also to offer a course in neuro-psychoanalysis for candidates at New York Psychoanalytic. But it was time to internationalize.

Smaller: Why was this important?
Solms: People in other parts of the world were starting to do the same thing we were doing in New York. A society and journal would help connect these groups. We also wanted to attract younger people interested in psychoanalysis and doing integrative research.

Smaller: Psychoanalysts often react poorly to new ideas. What is the threat?
Solms: I have a different way of thinking about it. I worry that the situation has deteriorated since those early days because rather than a small group of analysts working together for a long time, people began dabbling. We’ve done serious work. Our collaboration with Jaak Panksepp, an internationally known neuroscientist who has studied, among many things, affect in animals for over 30 years, is a good example. I think the resistance has been directed more at work generated outside our group. The group that Pfeffer and Ostow put together, were real analysts who love analysis and who respect the complexity of the mind.

Smaller: And the others?
Solms: I think some analysts became disenchanted with analysis and turned to neuroscience instead. To be absolutely honest, I shudder to think about what some of them are doing in the name of neuro-psychoanalysis.

Smaller: Which is why solid neuro-psychoanalytic research is so important.
Solms: Neuroscientists are looking at us with great expectations; we want to train real psychoanalysts to do this work—not dabblers.

Smaller: Can you summarize the goal, or mission of neuro-psychoanalysis?
Solms: We want to bring the soul into neuroscience. It’s in line with what Freud wanted to do all along.

Smaller: Clinicians wonder, what will be the benefit?
Solms: All patients will benefit if medicine realizes that the brain is a unique organ—it’s not like the liver: It has agency. It has feelings of its own. If we can introduce that to psychopharmacologists, we will have done something great for humanity. The brain is NOT a chemistry set! Psychoanalysis will finally get the recognition it deserves—no longer perceived as some occult practice, or as a bunch of greedy doctors whose practices are not evidence based.

Smaller: Is this a problem in psychoanalysis—how we are perceived by scientists and the public?
Solms: Psychoanalysis is fragmented into various schools. Neuro-psychoanalysis might help us to integrate the various views. Somewhere along the way the big picture got lost and analysis became too concerned about itself, rather than about the mind. Psychoanalysis lost its object, and entered into a relationship with itself—rather like a narcissistic patient. My worst nightmare is that neuro-psychoanalysis will become just another school of psychoanalysis. Its mission is to bring back the object. The mind is part of external reality—that is why we share it with other disciplines. Neuro-psychoanalysis can help us regain our link with that reality.
Transference Action

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Many of us in this country would say that we interpret action in the transference just as we would any other communication—as a compromise formation, for example (Brenner 1982)—and we cite Freud’s papers on technique and, later, the structural theory. But the French argue that the meaning of any such action cannot be interpreted because it has not yet been represented in words, and they cite Freud’s earlier papers on the necessity for action or thing presentations to be attached to word presentations in order to gain access to consciousness, according to the topographic theory. I oversimplify here, but it is an important theoretical bone of contention.

Anna Freud (1936) issued a related warning. Partly in response to the growing Kleinian emphasis on transference interpretation, she wrote that “a technique which concentrated too much on the transference” would overwhelm the ego, which would then itself become “swept into action” (p. 27), relinquishing its analyzing function. It was from Anna Freud’s more considered look at the ego that Gray (1994) based his contribution to transference analysis in the here and now. I am thinking of his meticulous focus on the sequence of drive derivatives in the patient’s associations, especially aggressive drive derivatives in the transference, and the moment patients shift away from the transference to something less risky. To some North Americans Gray’s focus on transference aggression sounded suspiciously Kleinian. But to Kleinians Gray sounded quite unfamiliar with his attention to the conscious capacities of the ego and his disregard of the countertransference and the interactive components of the work.

DILEMMAS OF PARTICIPATION

In my view, while each of these approaches has its value, what none of them, including that of the contemporary Kleinians, fully acknowledges is the analyst’s inevitable and ongoing participation in the patient’s transference fantasy or the dilemmas this phenomenon poses, regardless of the analyst’s favored technique. A brief clinical vignette, presented in a different form elsewhere (Smith 2001), will illustrate what I mean.

An analysand in her early forties, who wishes that I would encourage her sexual excitement rather than focusing on its angrier edge, senses that I have become momentarily distracted. “What are you doing?” she asks, before answering her own question. “You are simply adjusting your chair. I am so good.

I don’t turn around and look!” She is commenting—somewhat provocatively, I think—on a defensive “goodness” in her behavior, which I then link to her fear of her own destructiveness, something she and I have indeed been discussing recently. “Looking would be too aggressive,” I say. You will notice that I am focusing on her conflictual response to aggression, as Gray might, but finding it in her affect and activity, rather than in the content of her associations.

My patient seems to agree. “It would startle you,” she says, and then falls silent. After a minute, she tells me she has just become “aroused.” I look for what in my own behavior might have prompted this change in affect and infer that her arousal may be a response to her experience of my distractedness, which is still on my mind, if not on hers; in other words, that her sexual excitement is a reaching out to someone she has just lost. And so I say, “Notice that you got aroused just after you felt you had lost me.” “Perhaps,” she says, sounding unconvinced. I sense that I am off the mark, and that I have been led astray by my guilt and by my theory about her excitement. Suddenly, it occurs to me that it was not my distractedness but my comment that was the immediate precipitant for her arousal, and so I say, “Or perhaps your arousal started when I said that looking at me would be too aggressive.” “Yes,” she says with rising passion, “The sound of your voice got me excited,” and this discovery marks the beginning of a long journey in which we explore her wish that I might invite her into forbidden pleasures.

But notice what has happened. The erotic excitement my patient complains she needs me to facilitate is now being played out right before our eyes. She has found a way to experience this excitement, stimulated by the sound of my voice, at the very moment when I am speaking about her aggression, the thing she wishes I would not do. In fact, my effort to identify what excited her only excites her further.

So here we have a technical dilemma. If the sound of my voice arouses the erotic experience I am trying to analyze, then how can I speak about it without arousing her? The very fantasies my patient and I are analyzing are being enacted through the words we use to analyze them, and I cannot help but be a participant in my patient’s effort to actualize them.

INEVITABLE ENACTMENT

Persistent efforts to actualize such fantasies are sometimes thought to be characteristic of patients who have been severely traumatized, but it is my sense that to one degree or another, such enactments are an inevitable and continuous accomplishment of all analytic work, especially under conditions of intense transference experience. For if we look at the exchange between analyst and patient at the finest level of detail, every comment on the part of the analyst will be heard by the patient in terms of one transference fantasy or another and experienced as an

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actualization of it. And more often than not, analysts can, with a little care, identify precisely how they are participating unwittingly and unwittingly in that very fantasy.

As patients enter into the odd task we ask of them, they begin to live double lives (Smith in press), for despite their apparent pursuit of analytic understanding, they continue to use the words, setting, and activity of analysis to actualize the very wishes they are analyzing. As Friedman (2005) has pointed out, this is precisely what we encourage them to do, as we tease their wishes into the open at the same time as we unceremoniously interpret them. Actualizing their wishes is to be sure the more natural of the two lives we invite them to lead. Moreover, if the analyst is not only analyzing but also inevitably participating in the gratification of the patient’s wishes, then the ego, in Anna Freud’s terms, is inevitably caught up in the action, both the patient’s ego and the analyst’s. There is no absolute way out of the loop.

What then am I to do about my patient who insists on finding erotic meaning in my every word? It is easier to say what I will not do. I will not try to drain my voice of every note of recognizable affect, as analysts for a time recommended as a wishful solution. What I will try to do is what we have always done, analyze what is transpiring within the patient and between us—including what the patient is doing to and with my comments—analyze the patient’s experience, that is, even as I am participating in that experience; and I will do that by using all of the devices available to me, some of which I have detailed above. Only when we do away with the idea that the analyst can be outside this doing, can we begin to ask not when am I participating in an enactment, but how am I participating at any given moment. Only then does the analyst’s participation become an ongoing part of the data of observation, so that we can analyze what is being actualized in the real time of the hour. In this way, as Freud (1905) said of the transference, an apparent obstacle to our work can be turned to its advantage.

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______ (1914). Remembering, repeating and working-through (further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis). S. E., 12.
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ear” and, as an example, she cites Affekt, translated as “affect” rather than “feeling,” for “a language of feeling...was too everyday and undifferentiated.”11 Another admits that her translation is sometimes syntactically awkward. Another acknowledges that her translation runs into “occasional obscurities in Freud’s own language, and certainly some contortion in my attempts to render it.”12 The translations are not all that free of psychobabble. The shadow of the Standard Edition and the fact that psychoanalysis is an active field with its own language somewhat decreases the translators’ freedom of expression. Sometimes references to the Standard Edition are given as a comparative and contextual aid. The advantage of freshness in terminology also unfortunately obscures the fact that Freud was consistent throughout his work in his choice of terms. To help those who know psychoanalytic jargon and want to know how particular key terms have been translated, the German is sometimes found in square brackets.

Perhaps then one of the more interesting aspects of the Penguin Freud Project is the translators’ notes, which, unfortunately, are all too brief and limited. The translators are feeling their way toward translating Freud. We have much to learn from the translators and from making our own comparative studies of the translations. The new translations will open up new ways to hear Freud—to hear things that are latent in the text and that might otherwise be passed over.

Let us hope there will be many more translations. As Grubrich-Simitis comments: “[I]t would be desirable for more new translations to be made in the next few years, if only of individual works....”13 These new translations will result in important work on the problems of translating Freud into English, with reflections on the interrelations between German and English, with the attendant deepening understanding of Freud’s thought. Even though an analyst would have to struggle perhaps harder against the Standard Edition, it would be helpful if some new translations were done by analysts, for there are theoretical and clinical aspects that will not likely be available to a person who comes from a literary background. We no longer want one person’s view of the whole corpus, but rather we benefit from the input and views of many on how to render Freud’s German into English. And I, personally, would hope for some new translations to appear in a Budé type of bilingual presentation, so that the German text is always with us, as it should be.

What about a future Standard German Edition? Ilse Grubrich-Simitis has given us the history of the factors that have frustrated the production of a historical-critical edition in Germany. She has also provided many suggestions and even a draft of the presumed requirements for bringing about the complete German Standard Edition.14 It will require not only German analysts, but also German linguistic specialists. And we may hope someday to be entirely free of the restrictions upon the use of the Freud Archives and from the interference of the Freud family that has been so often recalcitrant and unhelpful in putting together a, or the, Standard German Edition of Freud. Strachey’s thanks for the use of photostatic copies should perhaps be considered as irony, given the nature of photostatic copies in the 1950s, when the actual manuscripts were only a few miles away.15

The main criticism of Strachey should be not the alleged scientism, but as Samuel Weber16 has argued, that Freud was rendered less problematic than he actually is by the Standard Edition. The Standard Edition distorts because it presumes that the original text knows what it is talking about, or at least what it wants to say—a presumption that may be just plain wrong in dealing with a discourse about the unconscious that involved the Copernican revolution of displacing consciousness from its central role. We must, according to Weber, pay attention not only to the manifest content, the words on Freud’s page, but to the latent, as yet unpacked, meanings, as Freud struggled to express what had not been expressed and was not perhaps expressible. Unpacking means not only making explicit the intellectual content, as when, for example, we find a whole theory sketched in the few lines of a footnote, a note we have not understood fully for decades. There is also unpacking in Weber’s sense, of close scrutiny of the German text with the idea of finding in it deeper meanings than the denotive surface. And I do not mean a furthering of the furor biographicus about the man, Freud, that has so plagued Freud studies over the past few decades, but a deeper understanding of the psychic phenomena that Freud was struggling to explain. This is the “return” to the texts of Freud that all, each in his own way, have called for; Strachey, Lacan, Foucault, Roustang, Ornstein, Weber, Laplanche et al, and now Grubrich-Simitis, with her call for a return to the manuscripts. The eventual, and inevitable, appearance of a standard and complete German edition of Freud should not end this search for the deeper meanings of the text, but actually intensify it.

Notes
11 Nicola Luckhurst, op. cit. pp. xxvii-xxxix.
Nonverbal Art

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concept that second-order neural maps exist initially in nonverbal form that can be simulated by imagination but are also capable of conversion into language. It expands on the astute insight of Leonardo carried down to the present: that a work of art reflects the “movement of the mind.” Moreover, such “movement of the mind” engaged in for its own sake is pleasurable in its own right as imaginative play.

Which brings us back to Freud.

As early as 1905 Freud, borrowing an idea from Fischer (1889), wrote: “…to derive pleasure from its [i.e., the mental apparatus] own movement of the mind” engaged in for its own sake is pleasurable in its own right as imaginative play. One can hardly fault Freud for not having made more discoveries. But he made a choice, perhaps based on the then perceived dichotomy of scientific truth versus artistic fantasy—and every choice involves a de-selection—for he ended the sentence with, “but I understand too little of aesthetics to try to enlarge on this statement” (pp. 95-96).

For the better part of a century, psychoanalysts have all but overlooked art’s potential for enlarging psychoanalysis, itself. Only in the last few decades has interest turned to the nonverbal aspects of psychic life—also referred to as the implicit, presymbolic, out-of-awareness, or unsymbolized. In my opinion, the arrested state of our wordbound concept of sublimation instantiates this.

Opening up a view of nonverbal sublimation of affect thus fills a notable gap. It is also timely in view of the contemporary discussion of the clinical and theoretical importance of non-mentalized processes of absence and emptiness, empathy and negative countertransference. Long before they became an object of psychoanalytic interest one was afforded a glimpse of their power, positive and negative, in Samuel Beckett’s (1955) potent imagery; for example, “in this world for you without arms” (p.12).

What if Freud had been more musically inclined? Might psychoanalysts have been more attuned to the nonverbal arts in general during the past half-century? Might we have picked up on their testimony that they act as essential containers for the unverbalizable play of implicit virtual motion and affect—thus prefiguring nonverbal aspects of therapy only now coming to be more fully appreciated?

Their resource potential remains to be further explored (Rose unpublished).

Notes


References


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Gender

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reform of its own. Some argued for jettisoning the concept, others proposed redefining it as a necessary fiction, needed for identity or prevention of lack of identity but not to be unself-consciously embraced. Others wanted to deconstruct the entire sex/gender binary. This era of debates is well represented in the journal, Studies in Gender and Sexuality, the editors of which are key contributors to the debates.

In this complex history of a word, so impossible to summarize adequately in a few words, one feature has been a constant: Because “gender” is a key site of prejudices, polemic in its use and over its usage produces counterpolemic, lash produces backlash, to an extent that gives support to the argument from philosophers of science that individual and cultural perceptions of sexual difference underlie all conceptual binaries. The repressed (or temporarily defeated) always returns, and there is always a struggle not to be trapped in the words that were used to avoid being trapped by words. Among some postmodernist theorists who criticized the idea of gender normativity, there is currently much effort to recover sex or the body (minus destiny), and to learn from medical specialties from endocrinology to neurology (minus their old patriarchal biases). From the psychoanalytic side, there is much attention to how sex is influenced by gender—the binary being read in the opposite from usual direction.

The great advance for psychoanalysis that this complex history has brought about is an appreciation of the complexity and variability over the lifespan of each individual’s sexed-and-gendered development as well as of cultural diversity and the complexity of cultural influence on individuals and groups. But the current situation is also novel (and especially chaotic) because almost all adult peoples who have felt themselves pathologized are represented in the current debates and the developmental stages of the word “gender” itself—shaped by its use by feminists, then by queer theorists, then by transgender theorists, many writing autobiographically—are known to all now, 150 years after Freud’s birth as a male infant of yet to be determined gender.

Cultural Historian

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We benefit from cultural history—from empathic accounts of the creative struggles of persons and groups in our past. By recognizing ourselves in the cultural symbols of struggles, triumphs, and defeats of the past, as well as the history of creative efforts, we may derive, as did Freud, inspiration for ourselves and our psychoanalytic institutions in the present and future. Cultural history and psychoanalysis are both quests for personal and cultural identifications with the experiences of the past, including the nonrational aspects of human life, as we pursue personal and group creativity.

Notes

3 The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), SE, IV, 96.
4 SE, II, 305; Stud. Erganzungsband, 97.
5 SE, XXIII, 228.